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The Seventh 
G e n e ra t i o n
“In our every deliberation, we must 
consider the impact of our decisions 
on the next seven generations.”
 -From the Great Law of the 
Iroquois Confederacy
Haiti’s Fault Lines: Made in the U.S.A.
by Marie Kennedy and Chris Tilly
(This article is reprinted from the March/April 2010 
issue of Dollars & Sense.)
The mainstream media got half the story right about 
Haiti. Reporters observed that Haiti’s stark poverty 
intensified the devastation caused by the recent 
earthquake. True: Hillside shantytowns, widespread 
concrete construction without rebar reinforcement, 
a grossly inadequate road network and a healthcare 
system mainly designed to cater to the small elite all 
contributed mightily to death and destruction. 
But what caused that poverty? U.S. readers and 
viewers might be forgiven for concluding that some 
inexplicable curse has handed Haiti corrupt and 
unstable governments, unproductive agriculture and 
widespread illiteracy. Televangelist Pat Robertson 
simply took this line of “explanation” to its nutty, 
racist conclusion when he opined that Haitians were 
paying for a pact with the devil. But the devil had little 
to do with Haiti’s underdevelopment. Instead, the 
fingerprints of more mundane actors—France and later 
the United States—are all over the crime scene. After 
the slave rebellion of 1791, France wrought massive 
destruction in attempting to recapture its former colony, 
then extracted 150 million francs of reparations, only 
fully paid off in 1947. France’s most poisonous legacy 
may have been the skin-color hierarchy that sparked 
fratricidal violence and still divides Haiti. 
While France accepted Haiti once the government 
started paying up, the United States, alarmed 
by the example of a slave republic, refused to 
recognize Haiti until 1862. That late-arriving 
recognition kicked off a continuing series of 
military and political interventions. The U.S. 
Marines occupied Haiti outright in the period 
1915-1934, modernizing the infrastructure but 
also revising laws to allow foreign ownership, 
turning over the country’s Treasury to a New 
York bank, saddling Haiti with a $40 million debt 
to the United States and reinforcing the status 
gap between mulattos and blacks. American 
governments backed the brutal, kleptocratic two-
generation Duvalier dictatorship from 1957-1986. 
When populist priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was 
elected president in 1990, the Bush I administration 
winked at the coup that ousted him a year later. 
Bill Clinton reversed course, ordering an invasion 
to restore Aristide, but used that intervention to 
impose the same free-trade “structural adjustment” 
Bush had sought. Bush II closed the circle by 
backing rebels who re-overthrew the re-elected 
Aristide in 2004. No wonder many Haitians are 
suspicious of the U.S. troops who poured in after 
the earthquake. 
Though coups and invasions grab headlines, U.S. 
economic interventions have had equally far-
reaching effects. U.S. goals for the last thirty years 
have been to open Haiti to American products, 
push Haiti’s self-sufficient peasants off the land 
and redirect the Haitian economy to plantation-
grown luxury crops and export assembly, both 
underpinned by cheap labor. Though Haiti has yet 
to boost its export capacity, the 
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“All planning is local,” says a commonly used 
adage. While it is true that most planning processes 
require an embeddedness in local contexts, the 
reality is that in our contemporary world, multiscalar 
planning processes where big multinational 
institutions intervene are becoming ever more 
prevalent. Local planning contexts interact with 
and affect and are affected by regional, national and 
international agents, conditions and processes. In this 
context, critical understandings of the roles of big 
multinational institutions in (dis)enabling sustainable 
and equitable planning projects and opportunities is 
underdeveloped and long overdue.
With this theme issue, Progressive Planning seeks 
to bring to the fore this discussion to unveil the 
traps as well as to illuminate the opportunities that 
progressive planners may encounter while dealing 
with, or acting within, big multinational institutions. 
Such conversation, merely starting to scratch the 
surface in this theme issue, ought to critically analyze 
the implications of the actions of big multinational 
institutions for physical, social, cultural, economic 
and environmental planning in urban and rural areas 
from a progressive standpoint. The scrutiny needs 
to encompass the planning philosophies, practices 
and projects of different types of multinational 
institutions: financial institutions such as the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Trade Organization, the Inter-American Development 
Bank; global institutions of diplomacy and planning 
such as the United Nations, with its multiple and 
diverse agencies; governmental institutions such 
as the Council of the European Union and USAID 
and equivalent nation-based agencies involved 
in international planning; transnational private 
corporations from a variety of sectors such as oil, 
food, electronics, information and communication 
Planning by Transnational Institutions:
Can Big Be Beautiful?
by Clara Irazábal 
Introduction to the Special Issue
technology (ICT) and apparel; a myriad of bi- or 
multinational NGOs who claim to do a variety of 
work, from democratization to education, religious 
proselytism to environmental planning; and more 
recently created institutions who claim to resist and 
redress neoliberalization such as the Bank of the 
South (Banco del Sur) and the Bolivarian Alliance for 
the Peoples of Our Americas (Alianza Bolivariana para 
los Pueblos de Nuestra América, ALBA).
When progressive rights activists and organizations 
repeatedly reveal the devastation brought 
on communities by the multi-million dollar 
interventions of the World Bank to create dams and 
other mega-projects, or the labor rights violations 
of corporations such as Walmart and Nike, or the 
accentuation of power imbalances and loss of local 
sovereignty brought about by “public-private” 
partnerships promoted by some USAID programs 
or the poverty provoked by “structural adjustment” 
packages promoted by the IMF, to name but a few, it 
becomes hard to discern what a progressive planner 
can do vis-à-vis these institutions and their practices. 
But the resources of such institutions and the energy 
behind their initiatives do not necessarily have to 
result in negative impacts for the communities in 
which they are deployed. With greater cultural 
sensitivity, understanding of historical and socio-
spatial context and truthful partnership with local 
residents and organizations, big multinational 
institutions could unleash great potential for 
progressive transformation of communities around 
the world. Funding from the Inter-American Bank 
has been leveled for the rehabilitation of favelas 
in Rio de Janeiro, the implementation of bus rapid 
transit in Curitiba and the preservation of the historic 
center of Quito. While these programs have had 
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their limitations, they represent a perfectible model 
of planning assisted by big multinationals. And 
as Nikhil Aziz mentions in his article about Haiti, 
organizations such as CARE had the courage to 
learn and change—amending negative practices and 
adopting more effective and just ones.
Furthermore, there are phenomenal and 
successful contestations to the regressive effects 
of multinationals that progressive movements 
can learn from and build upon, including: the 
“water wars” of Cochabamba, Bolivia, that ended a 
detrimental privatization policy; the story of cities 
like Atlanta and Buenos Aires, which privatized 
water, then experienced a decline in service 
and massive corruption, and at great expense 
returned water to the public administration; the 
constitutional challenges in South Africa to cost-
recovery water policies; the work of groups like 
the Blue Planet Project (connected to the Council 
of Canadians), which opposes water privatization 
throughout the world; and the position of La Via 
Campesina and Grassroots International on water 
as a human right provide plenty of inspiration and 
tactics with which to act. 
Moreover, every World Water Forum—a platform for 
the World Bank and some transnational corporations 
to promote water privatization and public-private 
partnerships that remove water from the human 
rights framework and from the commons—has been 
protested and interrupted by progressive groups. 
These groups in turn have led alternative congresses 
that meet at the same time in opposition. In China, 
India, Ghana and other countries, big dams have 
been built with promises of providing housing, jobs, 
water and electricity to the people displaced by the 
dam and to surrounding marginalized communities, 
but these promises have almost never been kept. 
Instead, water and power have been provided to 
multinational corporations, spurring large anti-big 
dam movements, particularly in India.
The articles in this theme issue put some of these 
matters in the context of particular case studies. 
From the standpoint of Grassroots International, the 
International Human Rights Funders Group and 
the Funders Network on Trade and Globalization, 
and drawing on his long-time involvement in 
Haiti, Nikhil Aziz denounces the contributions that 
USAID, the International Monetary Fund, the U.N. 
World Food Programme and the U.N. peacekeeping 
force MINUSTAH have made to Haiti’s lack of 
democracy and high level of dependency. Such 
interventions, he claims, created newer conditions 
of underdevelopment and disenfranchisement 
of Haitians. Despite the rhetorical intentions of 
aid programs with inspirational names, such as 
the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through 
Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE), they have 
had the effect of exploiting workers, devastating 
the livelihood of many rural residents, fueling 
rural-to-urban migration and undermining food 
security. Aziz’s article, on the other hand, mentions 
the beneficial role of CARE, the Haitian Platform to 
Advocate Alternative Development and the Platform 
of Haitian Human Rights Organizations (PAPDA and 
POHDH, respectively, both Grassroots International 
partners), and international media such as The Nation 
and Democracy Now. Now that conditions have 
worsened in Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake 
that devastated Port-au-Prince, it is time to act in 
ways that avoid the mistakes of the past and to 
envision a holistic reconstruction effort primarily 
based upon people-to-people initiatives, which the 
article claims amounts to “structural solidarity.”
Greg Contente discusses how, after a history rooted 
in exploitation by foreign powers, Bolivia is trying 
to redefine its relationship with these powers 
with its plans for lithium mining. In the 1990s, the 
transnational Lithium Corporation had unsuccessfully 
attempted to purchase rights to the Andean lithium 
reserves, demanding tax havens and environmental 
deregulation. Today, transnational companies discuss 
possible joint ventures with the government, even 
in face of the nationalization of similar industries. 
The country’s socialist government is aiming for the 
benefits to go to the Bolivian people, but Bolivia has 
to compete globally with transnationals operating 
in Chile, Argentina and China and needs to attract 
further investment. Proposals from potential 
transnational investors and financiers are not totally 
out of the question, given this competition, as the 
country tries to maneuver a difficult balance between 
sovereignty and development.
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Transnational corporations are always planners, 
engineering their environment to realize maximum 
profits, for example, by locating production where 
it is cheaper. Andrea Marpillero-Colomina presents 
an interesting perspective about corporations as 
planners, examining Nike’s efforts to expand and 
redirect its planning capacity from purchasing 
focused only on price and quality to purchasing that 
incorporated labor standards. The corporation was 
only moved to do so, however, when the success of 
the anti-sweatshop movement seriously threatened 
Nike’s consumer base. This is economic planning, 
balancing the profit margin it could realize from 
unfair labor practices with the profits it would lose 
by a loss of customers. The violation of decent labor 
conditions in supplier factories is a problem that 
many transnational corporations face, so the efforts 
of Nike and others to redress this problem can be 
very beneficial. In fact, this sort of private regulation 
is particularly important where public regulation is 
ineffective or has been rolled back by neoliberalism 
and free trade rules, such as those of the WTO. The 
Nike Village Development Project in Thailand reveals 
the dimension of the corporation as physical planner 
as well. This initiative, however, does not have the 
scale and impact of the global enforcement of labor 
standards. In fact, it is perhaps not too different from 
Coca Cola giving to the United Way—more an issue 
of public relations and charity in an effort to clean up 
its public image. In any case, Marpillero-Colomina’s 
article alerts us to the need to pay attention to the 
physical impact that transnational corporations have 
in the places where they operate. Often they cause 
massive environmental devastation, such as the 
deforestation of the Ecuadorian Amazon by Chevron 
and Texaco or the damage to river basins by Nestle in 
many areas of the U.S.
Laura Parisi brings her extensive expertise on gen-
der and human rights, development and transna-
tional feminism to bear on her analysis of the U.N. 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW). Parisi acknowledges the 
importance of the committee’s work in denounc-
ing crimes against women, such as when, in 2003, 
the committee conducted an investigation into the 
femicide in the export-processing zones in Ciudad 
Juárez, Mexico. Although the committee’s recom-
mendations were non-binding, its report was still an 
important public feminist statement that added to 
the shame and pressure being placed on the Mexi-
can government. Parisi offers proactive measures for 
the CEDAW committee to expand its influence on 
the achievement of substantive equality for women. 
These measures could enable its non-binding rec-
ommendations to be concretely realized through 
legal reforms with significant social implications 
for community transformation. The committee’s 
work is relevant to planning because it can influence 
legislative change in states, which in turn impacts 
localities and community groups. This influence has 
expanded in the context of gender mainstreaming 
mandates in recent years at both the U.N. and state 
level and the 2009 decision of the U.N. to create a 
new and consolidated women’s agency, opening 
up new possibilities for achieving women’s human 
rights. The creation of a women’s agency is ground-
breaking and can put women’s issues at the same 
level of institutional power as that in other U.N. 
agencies. Parisi points out that this is a victory of 
feminist activists, which underlines the need to con-
tinue to pressure the big institutions to evolve and 
act in progressive ways.
Reflecting on his experience in South Africa as 
organic intellectual, Richard Pithouse warns us 
to be weary of a tendency of NGOs substituting 
themselves for popular organizations in 
international networks in poorer parts of the 
world where organizations have limited access 
to transport and communication technologies. 
He also denounces the role of big multinational 
institutions in instilling in the public a need for 
structural adjustment policies, public-private 
partnership programs and other policies and 
programs that ultimately subject governments 
to their rule and demobilize people who 
otherwise would demand systemic changes 
against poverty. Pithouse reflects on the many 
challenges popular organizations face in order 
to organize and confront local struggles and big 
multinational institutions, let alone to build global 
solidarity movements against oppressive living 
conditions. His reflections alert us against easy 
assumptions that international networking is 
inherently superior to local activism, and instead 
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encourage us to continue searching for modes 
of international connections between the Global 
North and South that are more just and effective. 
Progressive Planning’s problematizing of the practices 
of big multinational institutions does not stop with 
these four articles. On the contrary, we extend an 
invitation to be mindful of how some technologies 
of governance portrayed as benevolent, i.e., as 
providing humanitarian aid or as instrument of 
needed modernization, may instead be facilitating 
an expansion of corporate capitalism and new 
forms of imperialism. In fact, some multinational 
institutions have operated as instruments of powerful 
national empires. In the Seventh Generation article in 
this issue, for instance, Marie Kennedy and Chris 
Tilly discuss how the U.S. intervention in Haiti has 
been institutionalized and operationalized through 
the U.N., USAID and other institutions. Yet, the 
same article discusses how other transnational 
organizations have provided a progressive 
counterpoint to those practices.
We need to expand awareness and analysis 
beyond the ‘usual suspects’ of globalization 
and transnationalism from above to better 
understand and be able to act progressively within 
the unfolding transformations of democracy, 
development, crisis-intervention and transnational 
activism in the world today. The time is ripe for 
complementing oppositional politics with proactive 
politics capable of bringing about the visions of 
sustainable and equitable development that we 
want to see in the world.
Clara Irazábal is an assistant professor of urban 
planning at Columbia University’s Graduate School of 
Architecture, Planning and Preservation in New York 
City. Her research focuses on the politics of placemaking 
and their impact on community development and socio-
spatial justice. She served as the theme editor of this issue 
of Progressive Planning.
first two goals have succeeded, shattering Haiti’s 
former productive capacity. In the early 1980s, 
the U.S. Agency for International Development 
exterminated Haiti’s hardy Creole pigs in the name 
of preventing a swine flu epidemic, then helpfully 
offered U.S. pigs that require expensive U.S.-
produced feeds and medicines. Cheap American 
rice imports so crippled the country’s breadbasket, 
the Artibonite, that Haiti, a rice exporter in the 
1980s, now imports massive amounts. Former 
peasants flooded into Port-au-Prince, doubling 
the population over the last quarter of a century, 
building makeshift housing, and setting the stage 
for the current catastrophe. 
In the wake of the disaster, U.S. aid continues to 
have two-edged effects. Each aid shipment that 
flies in American rice and flour instead of buying 
and distributing local rice or cassava continues to 
undermine agriculture and deepen dependency. 
Precious trucks and airstrips are used to marshal 
U.S. troops against overblown “security threats,” 
crowding out humanitarian assistance. The United 
States and other international donors show signs 
of once more using aid to leverage a free-trade 
agenda. If we seek to end Haiti’s curse, the first 
step is to realize that one of the curse’s main 
sources is...us. 
Marie Kennedy and Chris Tilly, both affiliated 
with UCLA, are present and past board members of 
Grassroots International (www.grassrootsonline.org), 
which has worked with Haitian partners for nearly 
twenty years (including on current relief). Kennedy 
is an editor of Progressive Planning and Tilly is a 
Dollars & Sense associate.
Kennedy and Tilly, cont’d from page 2
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(A shorter version of this article was 
published by CommonDreams.org on 
March 16, 2010.)
Some of the advice for how 
Haiti ought to rebuild after the 
earthquake sounds hauntingly 
familiar, echoing the same bad 
development advice that Haiti 
has received for decades, even 
before the nation faced its current 
devastating situation. To avoid 
repeating the past failures, we 
would be wise to review how 
previous aid models led down the 
wrong path.
Twelve years ago, Grassroots 
International released a 
research study entitled 
“Feeding Dependency, Starving 
Democracy: USAID Policies in 
Haiti.” Offering an in-depth 
examination of U.S. Agency 
for International Development 
(USAID) development policies in 
Haiti, the study concluded that, 
as the title suggests, official aid 
actually damaged the very aspects 
of Haitian society it was allegedly 
trying to fix—namely it created a 
lack of democracy and too much 
dependency.
The study was particularly critical 
of the development community 
for making Haiti into a net food 
importer when it had been nearly 
self-sufficient, and in fact a major 
rice producer. Despite, or because 
of, years of aid programs and 
Feeding Dependency, Starving Democracy…Still
by Nikhil Aziz
structural adjustment policies 
imposed by international financial 
institutions and donor countries, 
the study found that Haiti’s 
food dependency was actually 
increasing. This disturbing 
result was partially caused by 
subsidized food aid programs 
that benefited transnational 
agribusiness corporations but 
didn’t help Haitians grow food for 
their families. Sadly, much of the 
12-year-old study could have been 
written today.
As recently as 2007, a USAID 
agronomist told Grassroots 
International that there simply 
was no future for Haiti’s small 
farm sector, a callous prognosis 
for the nation’s 3 million-plus 
small farmers (of a population of 
9 million). In a nutshell, USAID’s 
plan for Haiti and many other poor 
countries has been to push farmers 
out of subsistence agriculture as 
quickly as possible. Farmers that 
might otherwise be supported to 
grow food are frequently engaged 
as laborers in work-for-food 
programs. Rather than pursue 
innovative programs to keep rural 
food markets local and support 
food sovereignty, misguided aid 
programs encourage farmers to 
grow higher value export crops 
such as cashews, coffee and, more 
recently, jatropha for agrofuels.
USAID policies seek to make 
optimum use of Haiti’s 
“comparative advantage”—i.e., 
its abundant cheap labor—by 
funneling displaced farmers 
into low-wage assembly 
plants in the cities or near the 
Dominican border. The result 
is staggering levels of rural-
to-urban migration, leading 
to dangerous overcrowding of 
Port-au-Prince. Passed by the 
U.S. Congress in 2006, programs 
such as the Haitian Hemispheric 
Opportunity through Partnership 
Encouragement Act (HOPE) have 
lured transnational companies 
to Haiti with offers of no-tariff 
exports on textiles assembled in 
Haitian factories to capitalize on 
this pool of laborers.
In the name of rebuilding Haiti, 
will USAID and other large donor 
and aid agencies pursue this 
same formula over the coming 
years? Or will it take a different 
tack that includes making Haiti’s 
vibrant network of civil society 
organizations central to rebuilding 
efforts?
While there is widespread hand-
wringing in the media that 
rebuilding efforts are hampered 
by the desperate poverty and lack 
of infrastructure, there is very 
little introspection about whether 
aid strategies and development 
and monetary policies may 
have actually contributed to this 
impoverishment and how those 
ought to change. Such critiques 
no. 183 / sPring 2010 9
are usually relegated to alternative 
media sources like The Nation and 
Democracy Now, or groups that 
have long-standing relations with 
grassroots Haitian movements.
Export-driven aid and 
development policies were a bad 
idea before the earthquake, and 
they are a terrible idea now. A 
wage freeze advocated by the 
International Monetary Fund 
shortly after the earthquake is 
simply inhumane and out of touch 
with reality.
Since our 1997 Grassroots 
International report, we note the 
following troubling trends.
• Food aid and food import 
dependency in Haiti has continued 
to rise despite the fact that the U.N. 
World Food Programme has been 
operating in Haiti since 1969. In 
1980, Haiti imported 16,000 metric 
tons of rice. After two successive 
phases of trade liberalization, Haiti 
was, by 2004, importing 270,000 
metric tons, a 17-fold increase. 
When prices of imported foods 
spiked in 2007, hungry families 
rebelled. Policies advancing food 
sovereignty are few, although 
we note the Herculean work of 
many Haitian popular and non-
governmental organizations in 
strengthening the ability of Haitian 
small farmers to grow food for 
their families and local markets.
• Rural-to-urban migration has 
risen annually by nearly 4.5 
percent. Although this trend 
showed immediate reversal after 
the earthquake, sprawling cities 
like Port-au-Prince had expanded 
rapidly, resulting in shoddily 
constructed and vulnerable slums. 
These neighborhoods, buried by 
mud in the hurricanes of 2008, are 
now crushed under rubble.
• Haiti’s ecology continues to 
deteriorate, demonstrated by the 
tremendous loss of life and soil in 
recent hurricanes. Forests barely 
cover 2 percent of Haitian territory, 
and between 1990 and 2000 the 
United Nations Development 
Programme reports that natural 
forest cover declined by 50 percent
TOP: Office of the Peasant 













• Promises of a robust assembly plant/maquila 
sector that could absorb unemployed farmers, 
spurred by the HOPE initiatives, have fallen 
short of expectations, creating far fewer jobs 
than imagined and at even lower wages than 
hoped. Worldwide competition for these assembly 
plants remains fierce; investors have found 
more attractive places than Haiti to set up shop. 
Casting further gloom on this sector is the current 
slowdown in the global economy. Fewer assembly 
plants may be necessary and the destruction of 
Haiti’s infrastructure makes it unlikely that plants 
would relocate there
• The experience of living with foreign troops has been 
difficult for Haiti. The U.N. Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH), a peacekeeping force, has received 
mixed reports at best. Over the last six years it has 
stationed between 6,000 and 9,000 troops in Haiti at 
enormous public expense. Many Haitians describe their 
situation as a military occupation, harkening back to 
frequent occupations in Haiti’s history. The Platform 
of Haitian Human Rights Organizations (POHDH), 
a Grassroots International partner, has documented 
numerous human rights abuses by MINUSTAH 
personnel. Development plans of some donor countries 
will rely on foreign troops for implementation, which 
may lead to more dependency and social unrest. A 
cautionary note about militarized aid comes from wary 
Haitians quoted in the media: “We asked for 10,000 
doctors and nurses; we got 10,000 soldiers.”
• Haiti’s foreign debt continued to rise from $1.2 to 
$1.5 billion in the period from 2003-2009. International 
lenders insisted on balancing budgets even if that 
meant cutting essential social services. Thankfully, 
there is now some movement towards debt 
cancellation.
What is a sound rehabilitation plan going forward? 
Camille Chalmers of the Haitian Platform to 
Advocate Alternative Development (PAPDA), another 
Grassroots International partner, has made some 
suggestions in these early days after the quake. Instead 
of traditional agency-to-agency aid that turns Haitians 
into “aid recipients” rather than protagonists of their 
recovery, this needs to be a people-to-people effort, 
what Chalmers describes as “structural solidarity.”
Chalmers notes that this reconstruction can’t be 
relegated to simply physical infrastructure. He asks 
that we work holistically to:
1.Overcome illiteracy, which afflicts 45 percent of 
the population;
2. Build an effective public school system that is both free 
and respects the history, culture and ecosystems of Haiti;
3. Reverse the environmental crisis and rebuild 
Haiti’s thirty watersheds with the massive 
participation of young people and international 
volunteers;
4. Fight child mortality, malnutrition and 
maternal mortality (currently 630 women per 
100,000 live births) by constructing a new 
public health system that brings together 
modern and traditional medicine and offers 
quality, affordable primary services to the 
entire population;
LEFT: Woman farmer speaking at the 35th 
anniversary of the Peasant Movement of 
Papaye (MPP)
OPPOSITE: Growing trees for reforestation in an 
MPP greenhouse
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5. Reconstruct a new capital city based on a different 
logic: humane and balanced urbanization that 
respects workers as the true wealth creators and 
privileges public transportation, parks that maximize 
biodiversity, urban agriculture and popular arts;
6. Move toward food sovereignty based on 
comprehensive agrarian reform, prioritizing 
agricultural investments that respect 
ecosystems, biodiversity and the needs and 
culture of small farmers;
7. Cut dependency ties with Washington, the 
European Union and others, and abandon policies 
issued by different versions of the “Washington 
Consensus”; and
8. End MINUSTAH and instead build people-to-
people solidarity brigades.
What would a holistic rehabilitation and development plan of 
this nature require? Much more than money! It would require 
a reversal of policies that are at their core counter to healthy, 
sustainable development. It would mean a stop to attempts 
to pry Haiti’s economy open to imports and to balance Haiti’s 
budget by cutting health and education spending. It would 
mean a start to implementing policies for environmentally-
friendly food sovereignty so that Haitians can eat the food they 
grow in fields that hold the soil and to a massive virtuous circle 
of support for both the governmental and non-governmental 
sectors so that they can grow strong together.
While many aspects of Haiti’s reality have stayed 
the same since Grassroots International published 
“Feeding Dependency, Starving Democracy” in 1998, 
others have changed for the better. Some aid agencies, 
such as CARE, took to heart many of the findings in 
the study and altered the way it provided aid. For 
example, in 2007 CARE gave up $45 million in annual 
federal funding because, as it said, “American food aid 
is not only plagued with inefficiencies, but also may 
hurt some of the very poor people it aims to help.” 
Other agencies expanded partnerships with Haitian 
social movements and utilized local expertise to 
inform their programs.
An essential part of Grassroots International’s work 
with the Haitian people over the coming years will 
be to try to keep the development industry honest 
and advocate for exactly this kind of long-term, 
holistic aid. At the same time, we’ll continue to 
build the kind of people-to-people solidarity that 
Chalmers suggests, helping grassroots organizations 
steer Haiti’s development agenda through the 
challenging decades ahead.
Nikhil Aziz is the executive director of Grassroots 
International (www.grassrootsonline.org). He also serves 
on the steering committee of the International Human 
Rights Funders Group and the Funders Network on 
Trade and Globalization. “Feeding Dependency, Starving 
Democracy: USAID Policies in Haiti” is available at 
http://www.grassrootsonline.org.
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The United Nations (U.N.) Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
is charged with overseeing member states’ 
implementation of the 1979 U.N. Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW). More recently, the 
CEDAW committee has expanded its mandate 
to monitor the implementation of the 1995 
U.N. Beijing Platform for Action that resulted 
from the Fourth World Conference on Women. 
The CEDAW committee is also now receiving 
communications under the Convention’s 
Optional Protocol in which individuals can file 
human rights complaints against states directly 
with the committee. The Optional Protocol 
also grants the committee power to conduct 
investigations with regard to women’s human 
rights violations. Meeting just three times a 
year, this 23-person committee is responsible 
for advocating on behalf of the world’s women 
and ensuring that governments comply with the 
primary women’s human rights treaty. This has 
not been an easy task—the convention has been 
one of the most highly contested human rights 
treaties ever produced in the U.N. system, and 
numerous states have attached “reservations” to 
the treaty, effectively claiming exemption from 
certain provisions. 
In the recently published book The Circle of 
Empowerment: Thirty-Five Years of the U.N. Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(Hanna Beate Schöp Schilling and Cees Flinterman, 
eds.), the story of the committee is told by fifty 
contributors, most of whom have been members of 
the committee at some point in the last twenty-five 
years. Their accounts illuminate the struggles of a 
committee that has historically been marginalized 
within the larger human rights framework, 
From Reaction to Proaction: 
Expanding the Scope of the CEDAW Committee’s Influence
by Laura Parisi
providing great insight into committee members’ 
thought processes as they tackled topics ranging 
from violence against women to labor rights, and 
as they continued to expand the notion of women’s 
human rights in creative and multiple ways. 
The contributors also detail the committee’s 
struggle with how to define itself in the context 
of new realities and responsibilities. Three of 
these responsibilities are notable for the purposes 
of this essay: 1) defining appropriate responses 
to non-state actors, such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and multinational 
corporations (MNCs); 2) deciding how to address 
the impact of globalization on women’s human 
rights; and 3) discussing the potential promise and 
pitfalls of the Optional Protocol. 
Since the convention has been and continues to be an 
important tool wielded by feminist activists on the 
ground to influence political, social and economic 
change, I consider how the CEDAW committee 
might address these issues in light of two recent 
and important developments. The first development 
is the formal adoption and deepening of gender 
mainstreaming mandates over the last decade at 
both the U.N. and state level (in the form of women’s 
ministries, etc.). The committee’s work is increasingly 
important for planning in a broad sense, as one of its 
central mandates is to influence legislative change 
in states, which in turn has policy implications for 
social and community transformation. The second 
development is the September 2009 U.N. decision 
to create a new and consolidated women’s agency. 
Thus, the committee is entering a new era in the 
U.N. with regard to gender equality and women’s 
empowerment, opening up new possibilities for 
influencing and engaging processes aimed at 
achieving women’s human rights.
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From Reaction to Proaction: 
Expanding the Scope of CEDAW’s Influence
One of the main critiques levied at the committee is 
that its recommendations to states on how to improve 
or achieve women’s human rights are not binding. 
The reporting process, in which the committee 
evaluates and comments on state reports as well as 
considers information submitted by NGOs, positions 
the committee as a reactive body rather than a 
proactive one. However, even though the committee’s 
recommendations (called concluding observations) 
are non-binding, there are both indirect and direct 
ways that the committee can proactively influence the 
adoption of their recommendations. 
1) Create a follow-up mechanism to monitor and assist 
states with eradicating laws that are discriminatory 
towards women.
In its forty-second session report (2008-09), the 
CEDAW committee notes that it has revisited 
a discussion from 2005 about establishing a 
follow-up mechanism to assist states in meeting 
their obligations to reform legislation that is 
discriminatory towards women. This assistance 
would include, but not be limited to, gender 
impact analyses of legislation as a form of 
awareness-raising in different government sectors, 
such as parliaments and judicial systems, and 
the identification of partners who could provide 
financial and technical assistance to the legal 
reform process. 
Though the committee has yet to come to a firm 
decision about the adoption of such a mechanism, it 
is currently considering two possible options. One 
option is the creation of a standing working group 
within the committee which would be charged with 
following up with state parties on recommendations 
for removing legislation that discriminates against 
women by enlisting current and former members of 
the committee. The rationale behind this proposal is 
that the diversity of membership would lend a critical 
insight into different cultures and legal systems which 
could be beneficial in terms of finding solutions to 
repealing and/or revising sex discriminatory laws. 
It would also allow for analysis of the relationship 
between gender and culture, and how this intersection 
creates specific and unique forms of inequality that 
are often invisibilized in the law, thus allowing 
the committee to pursue its mandate of achieving 
substantive equality for women, rather than just 
formal equality. 
The second proposed option is the creation of an 
independent commission that would function as a 
“Special Rapporteur” on sex discriminatory legislation 
which would build off of the recommendations of 
the committee to work with all states, regardless of 
A quilt produced by more than 200 marginalized 
Kyrgyz women to commemorate the 30th 
anniversary of CEDAW. The process of making the 











whether or not they are parties to the convention. 
This mechanism would also report to the Human 
Rights Council (HRC) and to the Commission on 
the Status of Women (CSW), which would aid in 
gender mainstreaming the work of the HRC as well 
in ensuring that women’s human rights issues are 
highlighted in the work of CSW, which is institutionally 
located in the U.N. Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). Forging a stronger connection with the 
committee and CSW would further buttress the work 
on the new U.N. women’s agency, and perhaps aid the 
committee’s struggles with how to address the impact 
of globalization on women’s human rights. Also, while 
the committee has been more open to working with 
NGOs in recent years and is currently debating how 
best to work with civil society organizations, CSW 
has a deeply entrenched relationship with women’s 
human rights and development organizations, given 
the extensive roster of those who have consultative 
status with ECOSOC. Should the committee begin 
to regularly report to CSW, there could be increased 
communication with and participation by NGOs (both 
directly and indirectly), since CSW could serve as 
another conduit to the committee.
Both proposed options would be useful in expanding 
the scope, visibility and transparency of the 
committee’s work and increasing the participation 
of civil society to hold states accountable for sex 
discrimination. It would also allow the committee to 
consider the role of MNCs; assisting states with legal 
reform may provide an opportunity to influence 
the regulation of MNCs, or to bring MNCs into the 
dialogue in a more proactive way. In any case, the 
committee should consider adopting one of these 
mechanisms, or perhaps a combination of the two, 
now that women’s issues are on the ascent, given 
the creation of the new women’s agency, which 
will be at the same level of institutional power 
as other agencies like the U.N. Children’s Fund, 
the U.N. Population Fund and the U.N. Refugee 
Agency. The committee should capitalize on this 
important victory by feminist activists by creating 
and supporting a mechanism which furthers the 
CEDAW committee goals of ensuring that legal 
reform translates into substantive and meaningful 
improvements in the daily lived realities of 
marginalized peoples.
2) Conduct more independent investigations.
Under the Optional Protocol, which currently has 
ninety-eight state parties, the committee can conduct 
independent investigations into human rights abuses if 
it determines through reliable sources that the abuses 
are either: 1) grave, which means that violations threaten 
the right to life, security and bodily integrity; and/or 
2) systematic, which means that abuses are not isolated 
incidents, but constitute a pattern. The committee can 
launch its own inquiry or do so at the request of another 
entity, such as an NGO, without permission from state 
parties, although it does need a state’s permission to 
conduct an investigation on the ground.
In 2003, the committee, in response to a request 
submitted by two NGOs, conducted an independent 
investigation into the alarming murder rate of young 
women in the export processing zones in Ciudad Juárez, 
Mexico. This investigation was the first of its kind for 
the committee, which determined that the situation in 
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Ciudad Juárez constituted both grave and systematic 
violations of women’s human rights. The committee 
interviewed local activists and families in the area in 
an attempt to understand the root causes of violence 
against women in a more holistic way and how this 
violence was affecting the community. In this way, its 
investigation went beyond looking at legal protections 
by giving a space to marginalized voices to be heard. 
The committee also looked at structural causes, such 
as poverty and other social conditions, as well as the 
cultural construction of gender in the Mexican context in 
order to understand why Mexican officials had placed 
little priority on a criminal investigation. 
Although the committee’s recommendations were 
non-binding, its report was still an important 
public feminist statement on femicide, adding to 
the increasing pressure being put on the Mexican 
government by both regional and international 
entities. In December 2009, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights found the Mexican 
government in violation of its obligations to protect 
women from violence in the Ciudad Juárez case. The 
government has been ordered to pay reparations 
to victims’ families as well as institute preventative 
measures, which may indirectly influence the conduct 
of MNCs in the export processing zones. 
I relay this story to emphasize the important role the 
CEDAW committee could play in gathering evidence 
necessary for such judicial outcomes. The Juárez 
investigation also reveals the ways in which the 
committee can study the impact of globalization on 
women’s human rights and how judicial mechanisms 
can deal with these impacts. As the committee is also 
trying to figure out how to best work with NGOs, this 
case charts an alternative path. Since NGOs are not 
always an accurate proxy for civil society, however, 
the committee’s decision to interview families in the 
community gave individuals direct access to a U.N. 
body that they would not normally have access to. In 
short, one of the most powerful tools the committee 
has is the power to shame governments into fulfilling 
their human rights obligations, and it should consider 
launching more of these independent investigations 
in the field (particularly self-initiated ones) and 
providing gender expertise to investigations carried 
out by other human rights bodies in the U.N. It 
should also continue its work to garner more state 
parties to ratify the Optional Protocol.
In conclusion, the CEDAW could deepen and expand 
its influence on the achievement of substantive equality 
for women through the proactive measures described 
above. These measures could enable its non-binding 
recommendations to be concretely realized through 
legal reform that is contextualized in a holistic way. 
Should the committee embark on this path, there 
will be important legal and social implications for 
progressive planners to consider regarding community 
transformation.
Dr. Laura Parisi is an assistant professor in the Department 
of Women’s Studies at the University of Victoria, British 
Columbia, Canada. Her work focuses on gender and human 
rights, development, globalization, transnational feminism 
and methodology.
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It’s often assumed that the international reach 
of big multinational institutions like the World 
Bank and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), along with many of the 
NGOs allied to them, needs to be matched by a 
counter internationalism from below. In the richer 
parts of the world, where there is better access 
to transport and communication technologies, it 
may well be possible for popular organizations to 
organize across borders and to send representatives 
to international meetings on their own terms. 
But in the poorer parts of the world it is often 
extremely difficult for popular organizations to 
work internationally. In these cases, the assumption 
that an effective response to the big multinational 
institutions must be a global response results in 
a tendency by NGOs to substitute themselves for 
popular organizations in international networks. 
There is no doubt that big multinational 
institutions have a very strong influence on how 
elites around the world understand cities and the 
competing claims of their residents. This influence 
can take the form of simple coercion, as with 
World Bank structural adjustment programs. It 
can also take the form of “partnerships,” as with 
various projects of organizations like USAID or 
the Cities Alliance, in which governments are 
won over with funding and the idea that these 
organizations offer “world-class” technical 
expertise. But these organizations don’t just try 
to subordinate or co-opt governments to their 
agendas; they also work with academics, NGOs 
and the media to shape the general understanding 
of cities and the competing claims of the different 
people and social forces that inhabit them. They 
also support projects that, like Slum Dwellers 
The Complicated Relationship of Transnational 
Organizations and Local Popular Movements: 
Reflections from South Africa
by Richard Pithouse
International, aim to mobilize poor people to 
accept oppression and to work within its limits 
rather than to challenge it directly.
Given the tremendous power of the big multinational 
institutions, it is no surprise that so many people 
argue that their global power must be challenged by 
global alliances of poor people and their supporters. 
This is not a new idea. When capitalism first 
spread across the globe, it was often argued that 
the workers’ movement must also internationalize 
itself. But although there were lots of inspiring 
examples of international cooperation between 
trade unions in different countries, the workers’ 
movement ultimately failed to organize itself in a 
truly international manner. On the contrary, workers 
often accepted the division of the working class into 
hierarchies based on nationality, race and gender. 
This meant that workers in the dominated countries 
often had to wage their own struggles as independent 
interventions because the workers’ movement that 
called itself “global” wasn’t really for all workers and 
didn’t recognize the realities of particular places in 
RIGHT: Abahlali baseMjondolo members from the 
new land occupation in Macasar Village, Cape 
Town, march into the city, May 25, 2009. 
FAR RIGHT: Abahlali baseMjondolo protest at the 
Kennedy Road settlement, September 14, 2005. 
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the world. This fact should lead us to be cautious of 
any easy optimism about a global solidarity against 
the big multi-national institutions. 
We also need to remember that, while organized 
workers in many countries have their own resources 
in the form of union dues, the urban poor often 
have extremely precarious livelihoods and are not 
able to fund their own organizations to undertake 
international work. International networking usually 
happens through the internet and international air 
travel. Many poor people’s organizations do not have 
regular access to the internet—it’s often a struggle 
just to gain and sustain access to electricity. And of 
course, air travel is often entirely unaffordable and 
it’s sometimes difficult for poor people to get visas.
When donors are willing to fund international 
networking by popular movements, they usually 
do so on their own terms and for their own projects 
and not in dialogue with the movements. And when 
movements are able to raise their own money they 
are often confronted with urgent immediate expenses 
for the costs of day-to-day organizing—costs that 
escalate enormously when state repression has to be 
confronted. Popular organizations will simply not 
survive if they do not prioritize collective work, like 
holding regular meetings, opposing evictions and 
supporting prisoners, over individual opportunities 
for international travel. 
Moreover, because most of the organizations 
that network internationally are professional 
organizations, they can often make decisions 
quite quickly and on an individual basis. But if a 
popular movement is democratic, the decision-
making process is inherently slow. For instance, 
if a shack dweller ’s movement receives an email 
inviting the movement to send a representative 
to a meeting, the movement may not receive the 
email until a few days after it has been sent. Once 
it does receive it, it will have to find space on its 
regular meeting agenda to discuss the invitation. 
This may be difficult if it is in the midst of 
confronting urgent issues like evictions or arrests. 
Once the issue has been discussed, the movement 
may decide that it needs to do some research on 
the proposed invitation before it can consider it 
carefully. Once that has been done, it may have 
to refer the invitation back to the branches of the 
movement for further discussion. If people agree 
to accept the invitation, they’ll then have to elect a 
representative to attend the meeting. That person 
will then have to begin the process of applying 
for a passport and a visa. All of this could easily 
take a few months. But most of the time, when 
an invitation is sent a reply is expected within 
days or, at best, a couple of weeks. If movements 
allow themselves to be pressured into giving up 
democratic politics, which is slow politics, for the 
fast politics of the NGO world, they tend to lose 
their mass support very quickly.
These material and political constraints to 
international networking mean that in poorer parts 
of the world, like Africa, it is donor-funded NGOs 
rather than popular organizations that are able to 
monopolize or to regulate access to international 
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spaces like the World Social Forum and regional 
social forums. And if popular movements are able 
to win some autonomous access to these spaces, 
they often find that all the important decisions have 
already been taken care of on email by NGOs and 
academics before the meetings start. 
The pervasive substitution of popular movements by 
NGOs in international forums and networks leads to 
all kinds of problems. The power relations between 
the NGOs and the popular movements will always 
be driven by class and may well also be driven by 
race, gender and nationality. While NGOs often 
tend to present the problems faced by poor people 
as technical policy questions, popular movements, 
driven by the day-to-day concerns of their members, 
often see the root cause of the problems in political 
questions about power relations. Moreover, the 
donor-funded NGOs tend to orient much of their 
work around the concerns and interests of their 
funders in the global North. In some cases, this 
leads them to try and capture the representation of 
popular movements in the South in order to deliver 
the appearance of popular support for the projects 
of their funders and allies in the North. In these 
cases, the NGOs tend to become very anxious, and in 
some instances highly authoritarian, when popular 
movements insist on representing themselves and 
on developing their own analysis of their situation. 
In South Africa, NGOs that work with the big 
multinational organizations as well as those that 
oppose them have both responded with shocking 
authoritarianism that, in some respects, mimics that 
of the state when popular movements have insisted 
on the right to represent themselves.
But perhaps the most fundamental difference 
between the donor-funded professional NGOs and 
the popular movements is that the former can only 
make arguments about how to achieve a better 
world, while the latter may attain the mass support 
to actually force governments, wealthy communities 
and big business to make concessions.
NGOs often justify their power over popular 
movements by saying that the movements are 
parochial and don’t understand the big picture. It 
is true that NGOs are often better placed to have 
a global picture, but while this is important, they 
usually fail to confront local political realities on the 
ground, which have to be confronted before any kind 
of popular mobilization is possible. And there are a 
lot of examples of how highly mobilized communities 
have won all kinds of victories and concessions from 
governments and multinational organizations by 
having organized themselves to become a powerful 
force on the ground. Ideally, on-the-ground movements 
should be able to have a conversation, on the basis of 
equality, with the NGOs and academics that are more 
easily able to take a global view. There is much that 
both sides can learn from each other. But for as long 
as the NGOs and academics deny this equality, that 
conversation cannot happen. What happens instead 
is often more like a form of top-down, stultifying 
instruction far removed from the lived realities of life 
and struggle confronted by popular movements.
In South Africa, the two most important popular 
urban movements walked out of the national NGO-
Photo by Kerry Chance
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dominated networking forum—a forum that also 
sought to regulate international networking—in 
2006 because they felt that they were systematically 
disrespected by the NGOs and treated as if they were 
stupid rather than poor. They also felt that the NGOs 
were exploiting the movements so that the NGOs 
could develop their own power in international 
networks, rather than supporting the movements to 
develop power on the ground. 
This walkout meant that the movements gave 
up access to NGO money and opportunities for 
international travel. But by building their own 
power in their communities on their own terms, the 
movements were later able to form more equitable 
relations with different NGOs that were prepared 
to put aside assumptions of superiority and to 
respond to the challenge issued by the movements 
to support, rather than lead. The movements 
were also able to develop their own relationships, 
often non-professionalized, with activists from 
other countries. Through these relationships, it 
slowly became possible for the movements to 
make international connections on their own 
terms with the political support of people that 
they knew and trusted. For instance, the shack 
dwellers movement Abahlali baseMjondolo was 
able to elect representatives to visit London and 
New York last year. Important solidarity initiatives 
were developed during these trips. Ashraf Cassiem 
from the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign 
in Cape Town was able to visit the United States 
recently, and after his visit, a Chicago Anti-Eviction 
Campaign was formed. 
This mode of developing international connections 
is far from perfect. For a start, it’s been based 
on individual relations with activists from the 
North who have come and lived in communities 
of struggle. These activists have earned the 
respect of the host communities and gained a real 
understanding of their situation and the political 
choices with which they confront that situation. 
But the problem with this mode of developing 
an internationalism to counter that of the big 
multinational organizations is that the reality of 
the global political economy means that while 
American or British activists may be able to afford 
to come and live in a struggling community in 
South Africa for a few months, a similar exchange 
doesn’t happen with Nigeria or Pakistan. But 
because these relations are based on slow politics, 
and on a clear understanding of the realities on the 
ground, they have enabled fruitful experiments in 
international networking, including the beginnings 
of direct, unmediated relationships between 
at least some people in popular movements in 
different countries. 
We should not assume that international 
networking is automatically superior to local 
activism. To do so not only marginalizes the poor 
from their own struggles, it is also politically 
wrongheaded because it doesn’t take into account 
the important reality that local expressions of 
international power can and often have been 
beaten back by local organization. We should 
recognize that international networking is 
valuable but that popular movements can’t rely 
on the professionalized circuits of NGO and 
academic activism to achieve this. If popular 
movements are going to be able to represent 
themselves, to share their experiences and to 
build genuine solidarity internationally, then 
they will have to look for ways to build slower 
and more democratic processes that enable direct 
horizontal relations, including solid personal 
relations, between movements.
Richard  Pi thouse  has  been  a  member  o f  Abahla l i 
baseMjondolo  s ince  the  movement ’s  incept ion . 
He  teaches  po l i t i cs  a t  Rhodes  Univers i ty  in 
South  Afr ica .
FAR LEFT: Abahlali baseMjondolo protest in the 
Foreman Road settlement, November 14, 2005
NEAR LEFT: Ashraf Cassiem from the Western 
Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign speaks outside the 
Constitutional Court in Johannesburg at the hearing 
of the case that Abahlali baseMjondolo successfully 
brought against the Slums Act, May 15, 2009. 
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In October 1996, when the Niketown opened in an 
upscale shopping strip in New York City, the store 
was the site of a large demonstration protesting Nike 
labor practices in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian 
countries. The protest disrupted sidewalk traffic 
and deterred customers from entering the store, and 
Niketown became an emblematic site of the inequity 
within Nike’s vertically integrated transnational 
production system. For Nike, this was a turning 
point, its corporate space and profits placed under 
direct threat.  
Nike, which commands over 45 percent of the global 
athletic shoe market, began to expand and redirect 
its corporate planning functions as a response to the 
conditions of globalized production systems, which 
have transformed the face and functionality of labor. In 
this current era of free trade and diminished limitations 
to cross-border production practices, Nike has followed 
corporate trends by geographically dispersing its 
economic operations in order to reduce labor costs 
and improve productivity levels. This aggressively 
profit-driven dispersion of operations often cultivates 
conditions which violate the human rights of workers. 
In the 1990s, Nike was exposed for brutal working 
conditions at some of its remote factory sites. 
Let’s step back to examine the larger theoretical 
context. In a 2008 Global Networks (Volume 8, Issue 1) 
article, Zachary Neal presents the concept of “the world 
city network.” This network is defined as a construct 
of globalization wherein “key cities throughout the 
world are used by global capital as ‘basing points’ in 
the spatial organization and articulation of production 
and markets.” These cities are organized as “spaces 
of flows,” facilitating the production and transfer of 
capital and labor. Drawing from the writings of urban 
sociologist Saskia Sassen, Neal explains that “despite 
the geographic dispersion which is globalization’s 
Nike Reimagineered: A Case Study Examining 
Expanded Corporate Planning Capacity 
by Andrea Marpillero-Colomina
namesake, there is at the same time a concentration 
of certain activities in certain cities.” Within areas of 
concentrated production, the unequal distribution of 
wealth between the high-paid workers of transnational 
corporations and the low-paid workers who support 
the production processes of these firms is particularly 
pronounced; congruent with the activities specific to 
world cities is concentrated inequity. 
“World firms” operate within these world cities 
and world city networks. Like in global cities, 
where research has indicated that indices of 
inequity are higher than in non-global cities, 
Neal finds that inequity in globalized firms is 
statistically significant. In concurrence with 
Neal’s findings, it seems evident that it is the 
structural mechanisms and production systems 
being employed by transnational firms that are the 
effecting variables in the development of urban 
centers which create and perpetuate inequity and 
marginalization of vulnerable populations. Thus, 
global firms are a responsible actor in the creation 
of economic, political and social conditions which 
marginalize certain populations operating as 
part of the production system of global cities and 
globalized networks. 
Outsourcing is a prime structural component of 
the integrated production systems of globalized 
firms that facilitate inequitable labor practices. 
Outsourcing facilitates opportunity for mistreatment 
of workers, because by transferring direct production 
responsibilities to a local provider, transnational 
corporations have less direct contact with workers 
and can more effectively argue that they lack the 
ability to control labor practices. Outsourcing to third-
party labor managers is both structural joist and an 
undermining factor in the function of the globalized 
city. Outsourcing allows the global firm to disconnect 
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Niketown, New York. Site of 1996 protests against 
factory conditions in Southeast Asia. In 2009, the 
store sold merchandise from over fifteen countries, 





from the localities which most fundamentally support 
its operation. Outsourcing creates a paradigm by 
which transnational corporations can negate their 
own trans-local impact and their responsibilities to the 
communities which provide labor.
Over the past twenty years, Nike has become a 
prominent emblem of the negative labor practices of 
transnational corporations. Throughout the 1990s, 
the “sweatshop” labor activist movement worked 
to expose the relationship of direct jurisdiction that 
Nike had the power to enforce at its factory sites. For 
much of the 1990s, Nike tried to avoid its supervisory 
responsibility for factory conditions by saying they 
were “just the buyer” from third-party production 
contractors. For activists, Nike’s excuses have been 
unacceptable, and activists have very publicly 
attempted to force the company to take responsibility 
for the working conditions of the people who 
manufacture their products abroad.
As social responsibility issues have become 
increasingly international, transnational activist 
networks have played a significant role in bringing 
together policymakers, experts, non-governmental 
organizations, and concerned citizen-activists around 
shared principles and values across nation-state 
boundaries. These cross-border political exchanges 
helped activists create new movement frames, 
transnational identities and coalitions through which 
to effectively and efficiently inform and carry out labor 
reform movements. 
The activist labor reform campaign called upon 
Nike to improve working conditions at its factory 
sites worldwide. Operating within the framework 
of reforming corporate practices and corporate 
responsibility, the “Just Don’t Do It” campaign (a play 
on Nike’s own “Just Do It” advertising slogan), an 
institutional boycott of Nike products at the University 
of Michigan, made the following demands: 
• Nike should pay workers a living wage, rather 
than wages based on mandatory overtime; 
• Nike should promote working conditions which 
are consistent with human rights;
• Nike should reform its corporate structure so 
that factory subcontractors are required to allow 
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workers the freedom to join a union and engage in 
collective bargaining; 
• Nike should permit independent monitoring 
of working conditions by local human rights 
organizations; and 
• Nike should work with its factory subcontractors 
to allow the redress of claims by workers fired for 
protesting working conditions.
As a response to the New York Niketown protest, 
Nike launched an aggressive counter-campaign to 
the accusations levied by activists. This was most 
fundamentally an effort to reassure consumers 
that Nike was a company that deserved continued 
customer loyalty. 
As a component of this campaign, Nike produced 
newspaper advertisements, letters to editors and 
correspondence with college and university presidents 
which responded to sweatshop allegations and 
broadly denied the exploitation of its workers. Nike 
sought to portray the company as a leader in corporate 
responsibility, taking steps to establish and maintain 
adequate labor standards in its facilities outside of the 
United States. Nike sought to refocus the emphasis 
of its transnational identity toward its supposed 
social responsibility and reform efforts. The nurturing 
and development of this new transnationally-aware 
identity was for the sake of consumer retention, an 
appeal to the more socially-aware consumers within 
its massive customer base. Nike has attempted to 
reformulate its identity as a transnational corporation 
from transnational imperialist to transnational 
ethicist. This communications campaign was the first 
time Nike sought to represent itself as an aware and 
ethically inclined entity, a voice of conscience within 
the community, albeit consumerist-driven. 
In the longer term, Nike has reexamined its 
labor practices and taken an active planning and 
programmatic development role in the communities 
where its factories are located. Since the end of the 
1990s, Nike has made a commitment to developing 
initiatives that address child labor, among other 
contentious issues, which led the company to question 
the ethics of its labor practices. Its commitment of 
resources, financial and otherwise, in collaboration 
with local NGOs as well as global retail organizations 
like the World Federation of the Sporting Goods 
Industry, which includes Nike, Adidas, Reebok, New 
Balance and Puma, demonstrates that Nike is at 
the forefront of an emerging transnational dialogue 
that addresses questions of fair trade and ethical 
production. The formation of these alliances represents 
the gains Nike is making in terms of forming a 
multimodal framework within which to address both 
macro- and micro-level corporate responsibility issues. 
In both the U.S. and abroad, Nike has taken steps 
to modify its corporate organizational structure 
to address activist demands. As one of the most 
publicized examples of a “bad” transnational 
corporation, Nike has tried to improve its reputation 
by making drastic structural reforms to its corporate 
operations. Through development of holistic location-
based programming aimed not just at improving 
working conditions but raising the overall quality of 
life for its employees, Nike has sought to demonstrate 
its commitment to the communities where its factories 
are located. 
As multi-sited ethnographic research on commodity 
chains has demonstrated, however, assessing the 
impact of stated reforms depends on place-based 
analyses because standardized reforms produce 
anything but standardized effects, as reforms are 
mediated by specific place-based and socio-cultural 
economic conditions. Rothenberg-Aalami’s 2005 
study (Global Networks, Volume 4, No. 4) of Nike’s 
factory sites, for instance, uncovered how the 
company’s reforms are mediated by the variety 
of corporate cultures and power relations that 
determine how networking occurs in different places; 
by the reinterpretation of national and regional 
policies by local leaders at sites of production; and by 
the fact that different conditions for labor exist within 
the same factories. This makes manifest the need to 
assess complex place-based labor conditions more 
carefully so that reforms to improve conditions for 
different places and groups of workers can be better 
tailored and hence, more effective and sustainable at 
redressing injustices.
The Safety, Health, Attitude, People, and 
Environment (SHAPE) Program is a wellness 
initiative which Nike has developed for universal 
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implementation at its factory sites around the 
world. The purported objectives of this integrative 
program are the implementation of safety standards 
at all factory sites, mandated regular breaks for 
employees and a recalibration of managerial 
oversight from disconnected and tyrannical to 
engaged and humane. The public announcement 
of this initiative is in tandem with Nike’s goal to 
transform its perceived identity from cold-hearted 
corporation to community interventionist. 
The Nike Village Development Project (NVDP) 
is a two-phase project which began in 1999 in the 
Nakhon Ratchasima Province of the Chakkarat 
District in Thailand, about 250 kilometers north 
of Bangkok. This project is the prime example 
of Nike’s role as planner instituting community 
development initiatives. The project was set up 
with Nike financing and with the cooperation of its 
factory site contractor, Union Footwear, to expand 
local economic opportunities in the surrounding 
villages. In the first phase of the NVDP (from 1999-
2002), Nike provided funding for the development 
of school scholarships, school lunch programs, 
women’s rights program initiatives, tree plantings 
and community vegetable gardens (also called 
vegetable banks for their revenue-generating 
value). In the second phase (from 2003-2006), Nike 
continued funding school scholarships, school 
lunch programs and women’s rights initiatives, and 
began funding initiatives for HIV/AIDS prevention 
and treatment, environmental restoration and 
community farming. The NVDP integrates all of 
Nike’s strategies to reformulate its identity and 
operational structure and introduce programmatic 
and planning reforms which demonstrate its role at 
the forefront of corporate reform.
Nike’s corporate responsibility agenda now extends 
and is manifested within both labor policy and 
physical environment-based planning issues. Despite 
the corporation’s initial denials of wrongdoing and 
perhaps preemptory claims of change, Nike has taken 
notable action in the long run. The establishment 
of the Committee on Ethics and Fair Trade (CEFT) 
to carry out independent monitoring and reporting 
on child labor demonstrates Nike’s response to 
allegations of unethical business practices. Likewise, 
the development of infrastructure needed “for 
responsible production” represents the physical 
planning counterpart to the policy agenda. 
Responding to the decade-long activist campaign 
protesting its unjust labor practices, the world’s 
largest athletic footwear and apparel corporation 
has redirected and expanded its capacity to reform 
labor practices and assume a physical and economic 
planning role in communities where its factories 
are located. The programs that Nike has cultivated 
demonstrate that the corporation has expanded its 
role as planner in order to protect its image and 
to continue operating through its transnational 
export-based production model while effectively 
retaining its primary focus on its global brand power, 
product development and retail. The majority of its 
production operations remain unchanged, but Nike 
has reimagineered itself from apparel producer to 
multi-dynamic planner in order to compete in today’s 
borderless capitalism. In this light, Nike is the ultimate 
transnational planner.   
Andrea Marpillero-Colomina earned her master’s degree in 
urban planning at Columbia University. She is currently 
working on research about Bus Rapid Transit systems 
and transnational planning. Catherine Barnes-Dömötör 
collaborated on aspects of the research for this article.
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Bolivia, which sits on the world’s largest lithium 
deposits, is about to open its first export-ready lithium 
mines. The South American nation is positioning 
itself to take advantage of the explosive growth in 
demand for the lightweight metal, which is used in 
the batteries of electric and hybrid cars, cell phones, 
laptops and other gadgets. Bloomberg Financial 
projects lithium-ion car battery sales alone will become 
a $100 billion a year industry in the next decade.
Bolivia’s history, rooted in silver, tin and gas exports, 
has a strong undercurrent of exploitation of people and 
resources by foreign powers. With lithium mining, the 
country is aggressively planning to ensure benefits go 
directly to the Bolivian people—an ambitious goal, but 
one the socialist government fully intends to implement.
 
Rapid industrialization and the swift completion of 
necessary infrastructure are critical to Bolivia being able 
to meet growing global lithium demand. This includes 
lithium evaporates processing plants and development 
of ancillary industries, as well as the highways, 
pipelines, electric power and other infrastructure 
needed to extract the deposits and transport the metal 
from the isolated processing plants. Bolivia talks of 
building permanent infrastructure that will enable the 
lithium industry and continue to service the region 
when resources run dry. Transnational companies are 
flooding into Bolivia to discuss possible joint ventures 
with the government, even in the face of Bolivia 
nationalizing similar industries. While the current 
administration balances foreign pressures and national 
interest, Bolivia is taking center stage as a possible New 
World leader in battery power.
A Brief History
Bolivia has exported raw materials since the 1500s, 
when the Spanish enslaved the local populace to 
mine silver. With a population of only nine million, 
the nation has the world’s fourth largest tin 
reserves, is Latin America’s second largest natural 
gas producer and possesses more than half of 
global lithium deposits.
Forty years ago, Bolivia first discovered lithium 
under its dried desert ocean floors in the Potosí 
Province. Under these majestic salt flats, the most 
accessible lithium reserves come from the brine 
buried beneath ancient seabeds. The Bolivian 
government declared the lithium a “fiscal reserve” 
and elected to sit on this potential wealth, as high 
costs made extraction not economically feasible. 
Since then, uses for lithium and subsequent 
demand have grown. The transnational Lithium 
Corporation (Lithco) attempted to purchase rights 
to the Andean lithium reserves in the 1990s. 
Lithco’s business plan involved the mining and 
quick exportation of the metal, with value-added 
processing to take place in U.S. facilities. After 
Lithco demanded tax havens and environmental 
deregulation of Bolivia’s prized salt flats, and in 
response to strong political pressure from Potosí, 
opponents convinced then President Jaime Paz 
Zamora to walk away from the Lithco contract. The 
vast salt flats remained untouched.
In 2005, Bolivia elected its first indigenous 
president, Evo Morales. On a platform of 
wealth redistribution and land reform, Morales 
nationalized the gas industry. His anti-imperialist, 
socialist policies discourage private investment. 
With growing world market demand, Morales 
reopened lithium-mining discussions, this time 
with promises of 100 percent state-owned facilities 
and visions of value-added domestic processing; 
the administration pledges to refuse the export of 
raw materials.
Lithium in Bolivia: 
Achieving Both Sovereignty and Development?
by Greg Contente
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Mountainous Obstacles
Chile and Argentina also have salt flats with large 
lithium deposits and are currently top world 
exporters. Chile, a strong proponent of neoliberal 
market economics, sold its reserves to two 
multinational companies, Soquimich and Rockwood 
Holdings. These firms trade raw lithium on Chinese 
and U.S. stock exchanges. Argentina recently struck 
deals with Toyota and Mitsubishi. Toyota’s deal 
includes a $120 million investment and requires the 
carmaker to open domestic factories for secondary 
products, like battery manufacturing. Unlike their 
Chilean counterparts who trade lithium on public 
exchanges, Argentina’s partners are mining lithium to 
fulfil their own integrated supply requirements. While 
batteries currently account for only 30 percent of 
global lithium demand, the trend of the largest lithium 
buyers mining their own supplies will surely redefine 
the industry’s future market structure.
Bolivia faces a more complex landscape and 
business model than its southern neighbors. The 
landlocked country is stuck in the middle of the 
Andes. Transportation costs will be excruciatingly 
high. To reach the nearest seaports, Bolivians must 
cross into Chile to access the Pacific Ocean. Existing 
highways are poorly maintained, and no direct land 
route through Bolivia connects the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans. 
Despite these challenges, Bolivia has a rich history 
of mining and exporting. While it currently lacks 
transportation infrastructure, it has cheap labor 
(due to a weak currency) and centuries of expertise 
in mining and exporting. With benefits from 
government ownership, domestic tax reserves could 
help overcome high transportation costs. Sweeping 
control of all nine Bolivian salt flats and over half the 
world’s reserves could advantage the nation with 
massive economies of scale. 
Officials downplay notions that government-
owned businesses don’t face competitive market 
forces. Bolivia still has to compete globally with 
transnationals operating in Chile, Argentina and 
China. Even though Bolivia has a recent history of 
nationalizing oil, gas and other mining activities, 
private companies still flock to negotiation tables for 
exclusive mining rights to the salt flats. If foreign firms 
are willing to take on risks associated with uncertain 
socialist government action, they must believe in the 
profitable extraction of lithium.
Surprisingly, it is not socialism that is slowing 
lithium exploitation. The central government created 
an independent, state-owned enterprise to run the 
lithium project and to coordinate infrastructure 
planning. Consolidating a bureaucratic mess involving 
at least five ministries, the cabinet created the Strategic 
Evaporates Resources Company of Bolivia (known 
by its Spanish acronym, EBRE). With autonomy and 
a broad mandate, EBRE assumed sole responsibility 
for extracting and processing the lithium and for 
petitioning for regional development infrastructure 
projects. Unfortunately, political infighting led to 
the dismantling of EBRE. Government officials had 
expected to grant Potosí a 25 percent share of tax 
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revenue from the lithium project, but rather than 
work within the EBRE framework, Potosí attempted 
to seize full control of the venture. Protests led to 
constitutional challenges that voided the autonomous 
EBRE. The government Mining Corporation of Bolivia 
(COMIBOL) once again controls the evaporates 
plants, and infrastructure planning authority has been 
bureaucratically spread among multiple ministries.
Phase One: The Pilot Project
Bolivia is currently working on the first phase of 
industrial development, a pilot project trial processing 
plant. Since each salt flat across the world has different 
consistencies of lithium and other mineral deposits, 
exploiting the metal is a delicate science. With an 
initial $8.4 million investment, Bolivia uses the small 
site with fourteen initial evaporate pools to master 
the individualized extraction process and to define 
the industrial needs of expanded operations. Still, 
the planning team is withholding regional planning 
recommendations until it can determine the areas of 
most dire need.
Officials emphasize Bolivia’s baby-steps approach to 
avoid rushed, costly mistakes. Discouragingly, plans 
for the potential influx of migrants into the region 
have yet to make the list of priorities. This utter lack 
of concern for regional planning echoes through the 
uncoordinated government departments. With an 
apparent disconnect between government agencies, 
finger-pointing and presumptions of other ministers 
assuming responsibility for plans leaves migration 
concerns ignored.
Phase Two: Infrastructure Industrialization
By the end of the year, COMIBOL expects to gradually 
start exporting its first batches of lithium carbonate and 
potassium chloride. At this point, the government will 
start a full push towards industrialization. Phase two 
will begin with preliminary outlines of the industry’s 
needs, followed by building a chemical refining plant 
for secondary products and petitioning the central 
government to construct infrastructure to support export. 
According to COMIBOL, the costs of industrialization 
are expected to range from $300 to $350 million, and 
this only includes direct investments in lithium plants, 
ignoring the possible $1 billion regional infrastructure 
costs to be undertaken by other national departments.
Even though lithium officials deny any firm plans, 
Bolivia recently unveiled a five-year plan for nationwide 
public investment. A two hundred kilometer water 
pipeline from Camargo to Rio Grande is the only project 
already in the works. Funds for speedways between 
Uyuni and Huancarani and between Uyuni and Potosí 
have been delegated. The creation of these highways will 
finally complete the anticipated Atlantic-Pacific corridor, 
which for its own separate transportation purposes 
should provide Silk Road-reminiscent economic 
stimulus. One hundred and fifty kilometers of electrical 
lines still need to connect the processing plants to the 
electrical grid in Punutuma. Additionally, proposals for 
a gas pipeline could re-circulate funds with contracts to 
the government-owned natural gas and oil company. 
And, although it has yet to be engineered, a railway 
connecting Bolivia’s hidden salt flats to Chile’s Pacific 
seaports must be developed. While these proposals 
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address much needed infrastructure, definitive plans 
for most of these projects have yet to materialize. As 
administrative leadership constantly changes hands and 
funding figures morph, the resulting lack of ministerial 
coordination suppresses progress.
Phase Three: Value-Added Manufacturing
With a firm stance that the lithium industry will 
be entirely state-owned and operated, Bolivia 
acknowledges its own production capabilities and 
shortfalls. The country has yet to officially rule out 
private investment as a source of funding advanced, 
phase three value-added processing. Transnational 
firms, importing new technologies and educated experts, 
could aid long-term hopes of increasing Bolivian human 
capital and productivity. Talks with Italian scientists to 
organize an “open technology exchange” are underway. 
Ultimately, to ensure value-added factory production 
stays within its borders, Bolivia needs to conjure further 
public or private investment. With the potentially high 
costs (both monetary and personnel) of phase three 
industrialization, the lithium team remains unsure of 
what lithium-ion battery manufacturing will remain 
under state control. President Morales promises “100 
percent Bolivian-run, value-added production.” But 
Morales has also admitted that Bolivia only possess the 
technology to export refined metal compounds, not the 
complex science know-how to manufacture the lucrative 
batteries. Morales regularly entertains proposals from 
potential transnational investors and financiers. Phase 
three industrialization is set to launch in 2014, when 
future political climates and financial constraints will 
dictate progress.
Unplanned Expansion
Two decades ago, Bolivia’s petrol capital, Santa Cruz, 
exploded with natural gas wealth. Without definitive 
zoning plans, Santa Cruz sprouted bands of unpaved 
roads in unorganized concentric rings, like a growing 
tree stump marking each passing year. Small enclaves 
of rich housing developments litter the otherwise 
unplanned city. Planning and coordination are costly 
endeavors that require large amounts of cash, people 
and resources, not to mention political cohesion. Even 
with all the natural gas revenues, Santa Cruz failed to 
spread the wealth, and income gaps and crime rates 
there are among Bolivia’s highest. Only roads in the 
original center and along the spokes and the rings 
circling the city are paved.
With a burst of economic growth and exploding 
migration, cities in the Potosí Province are at risk of a 
fate similar to Santa Cruz. While local citizens hope 
to reap the benefits of rapid industrialization, amidst 
paralyzing political infighting, it remains unclear 
who will be directly financed with lithium riches. 
Plans to facilitate trickle-down wealth have yet to 
be constructed. Micromanagement is not even an 
afterthought while ministerial leadership gets sorted 
out. Even once administrative power is established, will 
the prevailing laissez-faire outlook on regional planning 
hinder economic growth prospects? In Santa Cruz, 
the rich have benefited from the void filled by private 
development, while the impoverished majority suffers 
from unpaved roads, which halt all commerce during 
the rainy season when dirt roads become unusable. The 
benefits of centralized planning can easily outweigh the 
costs, with strong zoning laws properly facilitating city 
expansion and continued prosperity.
President Morales claims that “industrialization of a 
raw material is wealth, is dignity and is sovereignty.” 
Time will tell if national pride creates Saudi-like 
riches and dignity for South America’s second poorest 
country. With Morales primarily concerned with 
creating a “100 percent state-run enterprise” and not 
regional plans, the only certainty at this point is that 
lithium will create Bolivian sovereignty.
Greg Contente specializes in Latin American development. 
He currently resides in Bolivia.
FAR LEFT: Salt Pyramids, Salar de Uyuni, Potosí 
Province, Bolivia 
NEAR LEFT: Investigating the Salt Flats, Salar de 
Uyuni, Potosí Province 
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Planners Network Calls on Planners to Resist 
the Odious Arizona Immigration Law 
As progressive planners who are committed to opposing social injustice and 
discrimination, we strongly condemn the Arizona immigration law (SB 1070). 
The law, which requires police officers to establish the resident status or 
citizenship of individuals deemed “reasonably suspicious” opens the door to 
racial profiling and threatens the basic civil liberties of all ethnic minorities 
in Arizona.  As already noted by President Obama and other public officials, 
the law will breed mistrust between local law enforcement officials and local 
communities and it will instill fear and insecurity among the hundreds of 
thousands of undocumented immigrants who reside and work in the state.
Furthermore, by making it illegal to provide sanctuary to immigrants or to 
hire and transport day workers, this law is an affront to the extraordinary 
contributions and sacrifices that immigrants have made – and continue to make 
- to the social, cultural and economic fabric of the country.  
We call on all urban and regional planners to protest this law as an attack on the 
human rights and dignity of immigrants and people of color and to argue instead 
for passing comprehensive immigration reform measures that extend basic civil 
liberties and services to all individuals who reside and/or work in the state, 
irrespective of status.  Planners should also be at the forefront in supporting 
local efforts to plan inclusive communities and public spaces that enable people 
of diverse backgrounds to live and work together.
Since other states may follow Arizona’s lead, it is critical that we actively 
oppose the law. We call on citizens at large to join in economic boycotts of the 
state in order to send a clear message that an attack on immigrants is an attack 
on an all of us. 
 
Planners Network Steering Committee
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TOWARD A JUST METROPOLIS
From Crises to Possibilities
http://justmetropolis.org
A conference for planners, designers, activists, policymakers and citizens 
dedicated to a just future for all human settlements
June 16 - 20, 2010 
San Francisco Bay Area
Sponsored by:
Planners Network (PN)
Young Planners Network (YPN)
Architects/Designers/Planners for Social Responsibility (ADPSR)
New Village Press
Association for Community Design (ACD)
The Center for the Living City
This first-ever joint conference merges the annual conferences of leading national and international 
organizations to unite planners, architects, designers, urban activists, educators, journalists, 
policymakers, academics, students and concerned citizens from diverse backgrounds across North 
America who share a passion for social, environmental and economic justice.
 
Hosted by the Department of City & Regional Planning and the College of 
Environmental Design (CED) at the University of California, Berkeley.
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Two major world forums focused on urban issues—
the U.N.-sponsored World Urban Forum (WUF) and 
a social-movement-sponsored Social Urban Forum 
(SUF)—took place in Rio de Janiero in the last week 
of March, 2010. The forums were extremely different, 
almost existing in two different worlds, but they 
tolerated each other; the contrasts and similarities 
were striking.
In its own words, the World Urban Forum
…was established by the United Nations to 
examine one of the most pressing problems 
facing the world today: rapid urbanization and 
its impact on communities, cities, economies, 
climate change and policies.
It brings together government leaders, 
ministers, mayors, diplomats, members of 
national, regional and international associations 
of local governments, non-governmental 
and community organizations, professionals, 
academics, grassroots women’s organizations, 
youth and slum dwellers groups as partners 
working for better cities.
The theme for Rio 2010, The Right to the City - 
Bridging the Urban Divide, is in harmony with 
U.N.-HABITAT’s flagship report, State of the 
World’s Cities 2010-2011.
The theme sounds very socially-oriented indeed, 
and the report it references is a gold mine of data on 
urbanization around the world today. 
In its own words, the Social Urban Forum
took place in a nearby venue, with a similar 
time schedule and with a similar array of 
debates around urban issues, also focused 
on urban poverty and the environment. The 
Two World Urban Forums, Two Worlds Apart
by Peter Marcuse   
SUF gathered social movements, networks 
and civil society organizations around the 
world to share their experiences and express 
their concerns on the collective construction 
of a different perspective of the city through 
dialogue, expression of diversity and the 
strengthening of social movements and 
organizations’ articulations around the 
globe.
The WUF was, of course, much better funded, 
and claimed perhaps 13,000 attendees. At the 
WUF, present were Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, 
Brazil’s president; Ana Tibaijuka, director of U.N.-
HABITAT; Shaun Donovan, secretary, Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD); Ron Sims, 
deputy HUD secretary; Esther Brimmer, assistant 
secretary of state; Adolfo Carrion, director of the 
White House Office of Urban Affairs; and Judith 
Rodin, president of the Rockefeller Foundation. 
The language was overwhelmingly English, with 
simultaneous translation. 
At the SUF, at various larger meetings, over 1,000 
may have been present. The call to it came from 
Social Movements and Organizations of Rio de 
Janeiro, including many favela-based groups, 
advocacy organizations and a significant number 
RIGHT: U.S. Secretary of State and Brazilian President 
Luiz Agnacio da Silva at the World Urban Forum.
FAR RIGHT: Brazilian activists present closing 
statement at the Social Urban Forum
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of African and other developing countries groups; 
many had booths at the giant warehouse space the 
SUF had rented. The language was overwhelmingly 
Portuguese; at major sessions, simultaneous 
translation was provided. 
At both events, the talk was extensively of 
poverty, inequality, the divide between rich 
and poor and measures to address those issues. 
Each forum was overtly tolerant of the other, 
and accepted the existence and legitimacy of the 
other, with disagreements civilized rather than 
confrontational.
The contrasts between the ideological content of the 
two forums was sharp. To highlight some:
• At one of the “Dialogues” at the WUF, David 
Harvey spoke of and traced the economic problems 
of poverty and inequality to capitalism and the 
operations of the market, suggesting that the market 
as practiced had failed and needed to be replaced. 
The moderator, Neil Pierce, a respected urban 
journalist from Washington, D.C., asked whether 
the market was, nevertheless, inescapable as a way 
of allocating resources and motivating economic 
activity. Harvey pointed out that, judging by its 
results, the market didn’t do a good job of it, and 
most people in fact found the motivation for their 
actions outside of the market. Pierce simply shook 
his head in disbelief. The desirability/inevitability of 
capitalism was a foundational belief at the WUF; not 
so at the SUF, where it was often called into question.
• Issues of poverty, homelessness, insecurity 
and disease were major topics at both forums. 
At the WUF, these were documented, measured, 
graphed and displayed in powerpoint slides, and 
the difficulties of measurement and the quality of 
indicators were often discussed. At the SUF, these 
issues were narrated as part of daily experience, 
and their ubiquity was simply assumed, with little 
interest in measurement or indicators. Even more 
striking, the discussion in both places was limited 
to the condition of the poor, rather than their 
relationship to the activities of the rich (perhaps 
a limitation of some progressive planning also). 
But, at the WUF, the poor were dealt with as the 
objects, the beneficiaries of the policies there 
debated; inequalities in the distribution of goods 
was often referred to, inequalities of power rarely. 
At the SUF, the poor and their movements were 
the subjects of concern, the actors whose ideas 
and struggles for increased power were the key 
issues to be addressed. 
• The Right to the City as a slogan was in the 
heading of the call to the WUF, and the words 
were frequently used in the SUF as well. But 
the content was quite different. For most at the 
WUF, the Right to the City was at best a laundry 
list of goals to be achieved by better designed, 
managed and targeted policies. At the SUF, its 
content was much more radical—a demand for 
an alternative organization of the city, one in 
which not only the laundry-list items would 
be achieved, but the whole organization of the 
society gave priority to the well-being of all of 
its members. Bridging the Gap, in the call for 
the WUF, was there seen as moving the poor 
a little closer to those above them; in the SUF, 
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it was rather eradicating the 
distinction between above and 
below.
• “Best practices” were a 
mantra at the WUF, barely 
mentioned at the SUF. Best 
practices, after all, result 
from a survey of what is now 
being done, of the existing 
practices of existing cities. The 
vision of the SUF is oriented 
to deal with immediate 
problems, with what exists 
today, but goes beyond these. 
Thus, utopias were a topic of 
discussion there, in the sense 
not of something impossible, 
but of something to be 
pursued, something necessary, 
something toward which the 
existing needed to be turned.
The relationship of mutual 
recognition between the two 
forums raises interesting 
questions of strategy for 
progressives concerned 
about the shortcomings 
of liberal approaches to 
problems of social justice. 
Sometimes confrontation 
and sharp criticism are 
appropriate; at other times, 
cooperation on immediate 
actions, even if with different 
long-term perspectives, is 
productive. On the last day 
of both forums, an informal 
committee of activists from 
Brazilian social movements 
presented a statement at the 
SUF which was explicit in 
the radicalism of its analysis 
and goals, and it was adopted 
at a well-attended general 
session at the SUF’s great 
rented space. The text can be 
found at http://www.choike.
org/2009/eng/informes/7826.
html, and it is well worth a 
close look. It concludes with 
the call for a further meeting 
of the SUF paralleling the next 
meeting of the WUF in two 
years. It will be interesting 
to see what happens to this 
forum of movements in the 
meantime; it is worthy of 
international support. 
Peter Marcuse is a professor of 
urban planning emeritus in the 
School of Architecture, Planning 
and Preservation at Columbia 
University. He spoke at both the 
World Urban Forum and the 
Social Urban Forum. For more 
information, see Marcuse’s chapter 
“Rights in Cities and the Right to 
the City?” in Ana Sugranyes and 
Charlotte Mathivet (eds.), 2010, 
Cities for All: Proposals and 
Experiences towards the Right 
to the City, also available at http://
www.hic-net.org/content/Cities%20
fol%20All-ENG.pdf. 
RIGHT: Social Urban Forum 
meeting space
Photo courtesy of Social U
rban Forum
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Last September, Time began 
a year of coverage of Detroit. 
Judging by the coverage in the 
September issue and subsequent 
installations online, the 
magazine’s angle is to present 
the nation’s eleventh largest city 
as all but a lost cause. Naturally, 
there is a lot of heart and guts in 
the city and plenty of determined 
people working for its survival, 
but Time seems to be asking 
the question, Aren’t they just 
rearranging the deck chairs?
The introduction to a year 
of stories on Detroit in the 
September issue includes a broad 
land use recommendation:
For its part, Detroit must 
address the fact that a 
138-square-mile city that 
once accommodated 1.85 
million people is way 
too large for the 912,000 
who remain. The fire, 
police and sanitation 
departments couldn’t 
efficiently service the 
yawning stretches of 
barely inhabited areas 
even if the city could 
afford to maintain those 
operations at their former 
size. Detroit has to shrink 
its footprint, even if it 
means condemning decent 
houses in the gap-toothed 
areas and moving their 
occupants to compact 
Smart Decline and Planning Ideology
by Aaron McKeon
neighborhoods where they 
might find a modicum of 
security and service. Build 
greenbelts, which are a 
lot cheaper to maintain 
than untraveled streets. 
Encourage urban farming. 
Let the barren areas revert 
to nature.
This article did not use the 
terminology “smart decline” or 
“planned shrinkage,” but that 
is the tradition being invoked. 
Like a lot of coverage of so-called 
“shrinking cities,” this framing of 
the situation uses the magnitude 
of the numbers to make the 
dismantling of the city seem 
like a fait accompli and the only 
logical way to proceed.  
David Harvey, writing more 
than thirty years ago, warned of 
oscillations in planning ideology 
that would give this kind of 
thinking a great deal of appeal 
to planners. Harvey was writing 
at a time when New York City’s 
Housing and Development 
administrator, Roger Starr, 
was advocating the “planned 
shrinkage” of places that were 
thought to be too far gone, like 
the South Bronx. 
 
The thinking was that some 
neighborhoods could not be 
“turned around” and that it was 
a misuse of public funds to keep 
health clinics, fire departments 
and other city services operating 
there. Inhumane as this sounds, 
Harvey suggests that this is not 
a completely crazy endpoint 
for a planning ideology whose 
central aim is to ensure that 
the built environment nurtures 
the “reproduction of the social 
order.” Harvey’s 1978 article On 
Planning the Ideology of Planning 
states:
If the problem lies in lack 
or excess of investment 
in the built environment 
then the planner must 
perforce set to work to 
stimulate investment or to 
manage and ‘rationalize’ 
devaluation with 
techniques of ‘planned 
shrinkage,’ urban renewal 
and even the production 
of ‘planning blight’ (which 
amounts to nothing more 
than earmarking certain 
areas for devaluation).
Harvey’s point is that when 
planning’s underlying objective 
is to make sure that a place is 
appealing to capital, anything 
can seem like a good idea. In 
cities like Detroit, Buffalo, Flint, 
Philadelphia and Youngstown, 
politicians and neighbors 
alike are clamoring for funds 
for the demolition and/
or deconstruction of homes. 
Districts within these cities 
squabble over demolition funds. 
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The new dream for these cities 
is that the neighborhoods most 
heavily pockmarked by vacancies 
and abandonment can revert to 
use for agriculture, stormwater 
retention, wetland creation or 
some other beneficial, quasi-
greenfield function. 
One of the ironic aspects of this 
trend is that its advocates toss 
around the word “sustainability” 
to justify it, when it represents 
a commitment to shifting away 
from dense, walkable land use 
patterns and sunk investments 
like roads and sewer systems. As 
the city is “greened,” commuters 
working in the central business 
district drive farther and farther 
to get to homes in the exurbs 
that break up natural habitat and 
disrupt agricultural activities.
The term “smart decline” was 
coined by Deborah and Frank 
Popper in their 2002 article in 
Planning entitled “Small Can Be 
Beautiful.” It was picked up by 
the City of Youngstown when 
planners there began thinking 
about the city’s 2010 plan. The 
Poppers suggest a paradigm 
shift—away from planning for 
growth and toward thinking 
about what a city with shrinking 
resources could safely jettison. 
In Youngstown, this has been 
rolled into a plan to tug people 
out of some neighborhoods 
using a combination of carrots 
and sticks. If you live in a 
“targeted” neighborhood, 
your home is not eligible for 
certain city home improvement 
grants and you are eligible for 
$50,000 to relocate into another 
neighborhood. 
The Youngstown 2010 Plan was, 
by all accounts, done as well as 
it could be. The plan has a broad 
base of support. Residents and 
many activists are upbeat about 
possible benefits, including the 
deconstruction of homes rather 
than demolition, with building 
materials being salvaged and 
reused whenever possible. 
Finding and/or growing local 
construction crews that can do 
this kind of deconstruction work 
may be a new growth industry 
in cities like Youngstown. 
Similarly appealing is the 
prospect of teaching kids how 
to turn vacant acreage into 
commercially successful urban 
farms or woodlots. 
Youngstown’s plan has hit 
snags though. People are 
not moving out of their 
neighborhoods voluntarily in 
large numbers. Demolitions are 
happening at a faster pace but 
tend to be fairly piecemeal, not 
creating large swaths of green 
space, as was intended.
Whether or not the plan 
is “successful” in terms of 
achieving its own stated 
goals and objectives, the 
Youngstown 2010 Plan has 
done two important things: it 
has signaled to local owners 
of capital that community 
resources will be used to 
subsidize their interests, not 
those of the worst off in the 
city, and it has set a precedent 
for the rest of the Rust Belt. The 
mayor of Flint, Michigan, was 
quoted last March as saying 
that he might support “shutting 
down quadrants of the city.” 
What has not been seriously 
considered is a program to 
turn the “smart decline” idea 
around and use it to achieve 
real sustainability. Looked 
at regionally, it would be 
substantially more efficient, 
and a greater saving of public 
dollars, to target “smart 
decline” policies at the edge 
of development and provide 
vouchers for suburban residents 
to relocate within cities. If 
the goal were truly efficiency, 
rather than slum clearance, the 
demolition would be going on 
in the exurbs.  
While it will be a long time 
before wholesale demolition 
of McMansions is politically 
palatable, an interesting 
variation on this paradigm is 
being tested in Syracuse, New 
York. There, a collaboration 
between Syracuse University, 
the Syracuse City School District 
and the Say Yes to Education 
Foundation has resulted in a 
program to give every graduate 
of the City school district free 
tuition at Syracuse University 
and a number of other colleges. 
The Say Yes to Education Program 
amounts to a carrot of gigantic 
proportions (at least $120,000) to 
move into the school district and, 
per the terms of the program, keep 
a student there for the three years 
prior to graduation. Last fall, the 
city’s ailing district saw a nearly 
two percent increase in enrollment, 
while nearly all other nearby 
districts lost students.   
The real problem with talking 
about population loss as a 
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citywide problem is that it 
draws attention away from 
the fact that the issues related 
to population loss involve 
neighbors and neighborhoods. 
From city hall’s perspective, 
the first principle should be 
to prize every neighborhood 
in the same way that its 
residents do. A string of vacant 
homes on a block looks like a 
problem waiting for a solution 
to a planner conducting a 
windshield survey, but each 
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home has its own history 
and its place within the 
neighborhood’s fabric. 
At the same time, it would be 
foolish to suggest that every 
vacant home can be rehabilitated 
or that vacant buildings are not 
magnets for crime. Frequently 
it is neighbors who are 
clamoring for the demolition 
of what they consider to be 
nuisance properties. And, to 
the extent that residents within 
a neighborhood are pursuing 
the removal of some structures, 
there may be some value in 
thinking strategically about the 
long-term implications of these 
demolitions. But a neighborhood 
of gardens and stormwater 
retention ponds has its own 
issues in terms of the services 
and lifestyle it can offer its 
residents. 
Aaron McKeon is a planner and GIS 
analyst living in Syracuse, NY.
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The Los Angeles Times (March 1 and March 14, 2010), 
Southern California’s rapidly shrinking, former 
newspaper of record, repeatedly complains that Los 
Angeles’s elected officials, primarily Mayor Antonio 
Villaraigosa and the fifteen members of the Los 
Angeles City Council, do not have a plan to guide 
them in their massive, highly selective cutbacks in 
municipal services, layoffs of public employees and 
increases in resident fees for city services. 
It is too bad that the editorial staff of the LA Times has 
not bothered to read its own newspaper. If they had, 
they would know that LA’s elected officials have two 
plans before them, and they are carefully following 
one of them. They would also know that similar plans 
are being implemented at the Los Angeles Unified 
School District (LAUSD), not far down the street from 
City Hall. Its budget is as large as the city’s, but its 
budget deficit is even larger ($600 million vs. $450 
million), as is its layoff list (6,000 vs. 4,000 public 
employees). Likewise, like the State of California, 
LA’s regional transit agency, the Metropolitan Transit 
Authority (MTA), the Los Angeles Community College 
District and the MetroLink regional rail service are 
also facing massive budget deficits and responding to 
them with the same formula of cutbacks, layoffs and 
extra fees. The only difference between their plight 
and the city’s is the extraordinary amount of pushback 
by students and teachers against budget cutbacks and 
fee increases. On March 4, 2010, rallies and marches 
that drew participants from across the state and from 
all levels of public education—K-12, community 
colleges and universities—were held.
The Los Angeles General Plan
One plan available to LA’s elected officials, the Los 
Angeles General Plan, and especially its Framework 
Element, is required by state law and cost the city 
millions of dollars to prepare in the early 1990s. The 
General Plan Framework Element was based on 
rigorous research, honed through several hundred 
public meetings and carefully reviewed, debated and 
legally adopted by the City Council and mayor in 
1995. Despite the current ignorance of LA’s largest 
newspaper, this plan forecast the city’s growth and 
the infrastructure, housing and employment needs of 
a growing population and clearly identified the city’s 
policies and priorities for the next two decades (1990 - 
2010). But, shortly after the plan’s formal adoption, the 
same elected officials, along with the Department of 
City Planning, dropped the plan like a hot potato. 
The General Plan Framework Element became a 
shelf document, presumably for two reasons. First, 
in the era after LA’s 1992 urban rebellion, the largest 
civil disturbance in the United States since the Civil 
War, policing became City Hall’s only infrastructure 
priority. Since then every city politician, especially 
Mayor Villaraigosa, has been fixated on hiring 
more cops. Second, the General Plan Framework 
Element highlighted the city’s broad infrastructure 
requirements and called for a rigorous monitoring 
system which could be used for reviewing real 
estate projects. In a city with the country’s worst 
traffic, air and streets, the Framework’s focus 
on infrastructure monitoring and infrastructure 
construction would have put a straightjacket on real 
estate speculation. 
City Hall’s decision to jettison the framework 
shortly after it was adopted was no different than 
parallel decisions in Washington during the 1990s 
to roll back financial regulations and enforcement 
in order to green-light riskier investments. This is 
why the framework has been totally ignored ever 
since by the city’s elected officials, department 
managers and local press. The framework’s horizon 
Los Angeles Throws its General Plan Overboard as 
the Ship Goes Down 
by Richard Platkin
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year is 2010, meaning its empirical basis is about 
to expire and there are no known plans to update, 
rescind or replace it. 
The Neoliberal “Race to the Bottom” Plan
Nevertheless, as LA’s city officials muddle through 
the “Great Recession,” they still have another plan to 
guide their cleavers in carving away vital municipal 
services and firing thousands of public employees. 
It is their neoliberal “Race to the Bottom” plan. The 
difference is that the Race to the Bottom Plan was 
never required by state law, openly researched, put in 
writing, debated, legally adopted or shared with the 
public. Nevertheless, the LA Times reports about this 
plan every day, including admonishing editorials and 
intricate details about the two teams competing with 
each other over the best way to reach bottom.
So what is the Race to the Bottom plan, who are the 
two teams competing to implement it and what are 
their differences? In one corner is Mayor Antonio 
Villaraigosa, the California chair of Hillary Clinton’s 
presidential campaign, then Barack Obama’s. He is 
backed by a majority of the largely Democratic City 
Council and guided by the city’s administrative 
officer, hatchet man Miguel Santana, as well as an 
in-house Wall Street banker, Austin Beutner. The 
latter’s illustrious pedigree includes high finance jobs 
at Smith Barney and the Blackstone Group, and a job 
at the U.S. State Department working to ensure the 
rebirth of market capitalism in Russia. The mayor also 
has a cheering section from Wall Street’s three major 
bond rating companies. Their job, like the LA Times, 
is to stampede the City Council whenever it takes a 
breather in slicing and dicing city government’s non-
police functions. 
In the other corner are several members of the Los 
Angeles City Council. They are backed by most of 
the city’s employee unions and some neighborhood 
associations. So far this team’s greatest achievement 
has been to cut city programs from the top through 
the ERIP, a golden handshake program to retire 2,400 
older employees. Otherwise, they call for shifting cuts 
to other city departments, contracting out slightly less 
municipal services and better scrutinizing the sell-off 
of city assets. 
So, what is the mysterious Race to the Bottom plan 
on which these two teams agree? So far it has at least 
seventeen components, and counting. 
1) Scrupulously make sure that there is absolutely no 
connection between the city’s feeble planning process 
and its even more feeble budgeting process.
2) Reduce the non-police role of city government 
by eliminating several civilian departments, 
shrinking many municipal programs and getting 
rid of thousands of career city employees in these 
“superfluous” offices. They are throwing overboard 
those civil servants who deal with cultural events, 
urban forestry, libraries, parks, environmental affairs, 
View through the smog of Century City, Santa 
Monica Bay and Catalina Island from the Santa 
Monica Mountains.
Photo by Richard Platkin
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social services, code violations and neighborhood 
councils. So far the two teams reluctantly agreed to the 
early retirement program and are now preparing to 
fire 4,000 city employees, with the Los Angeles Police 
Department, of course, exempted from layoffs. While 
Los Angeles has had many smaller budget crises in 
recent decades, all associated with civilian hiring 
and pay freezes, this time the elected officials have 
really rolled up their sleeves. In the midst of a deep 
recession, these economic wizards want to slash public 
payrolls to make sure that the city’s job losses keep up 
with those in the private sector. 
3) Cut the hours and pay of remaining non-police 
employees by 10 percent through furloughs.
4) Reduce the power of public employee unions to 
organize labor actions, negotiate contracts, protect 
their members and set an example for private-sector 
workers in terms of salaries, benefits, job security and 
protection and retirement.
5) Increase the payroll deductions for remaining 
civilian employees.
6) Except for parking violations, minimize 
enforcement of the city’s many laws, especially 
building and zoning codes.
7) Accelerate the processing of applications for 
building permits and related city planning land use 
“entitlements.” To expedite these permits, the mayor 
deployed the head of his Business Team, Bud Ovrom, 
to become the new general manager of the city’s 
Department of Building Safety.
8) Increase city revenues through jacked-up regressive 
fees on municipal services, such as electricity, water 
and garbage collection, as well as through enormous 
increases in the cost of parking meters and fines for 
traffic violations.
9) Offer truly enormous grants, cheap loans, fee 
waivers and subsidized public infrastructure to 
large real estate projects primarily paid for by 
the city’s general fund, with smaller amounts 
from the city’s Community Redevelopment 
Agency.
10) Avoid any analysis of the causes of the city’s 
repeated budget crises in the past or at present, 
other than the current recession. Two decades of 
deferred infrastructure investments, as well as 
numerous hiring and promotion freezes, along with 
several rounds of smaller layoffs have, in effect, 
been ruled out-of-order.
11) Never call for any progressive taxes and never 
mention proposed reforms of Proposition 13, 
which, since its adoption in 1979, has cost state and 
local government dearly. Serious analysts know 
Proposition 13 has become a major tax dodge for 
commercial property. Nevertheless, it will continue 
to be a major backdoor subsidy for those who 
invest in commercial real estate in Los Angeles and 
the rest of California. 
12) Maintain absolute silence on the long-term 
reductions in federal programs for cities since the 
Nixon administration, as well as in two expensive 
current federal programs for which the sky is the 
funding limit: the bailout of the banksters and 
the endless wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and probably Iran. When it comes to these 
extraordinarily expensive and illegal energy wars, 
both of City Hall’s cutback teams have taken an 
oath of silence. 
13) Lease or sell off moneymaking city assets, such as 
parking structures and parking meters.
14) Privatize more city services, such as computing, 
which will go to Google. 
15) Defer investment in the city’s infrastructure, even 
though Los Angeles sits on major earthquake faults and is 
subject to life-threatening floods and wildfires. The “Big 
One,” a massive earthquake larger than 1992’s Northridge 
earthquake, could happen at any moment, according 
to the U.S. Geological Service and FEMA, and yet City 
Hall has systematically avoided adequate infrastructure 
planning and investment since that late 1960s. 
16) Erode public employee pensions by increasing 
deductions for remaining employees and discuss 
changes in retirement formulas, such as age 
requirements. 
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17) Join the corporate media by floating proposals to 
cut back civil service protection for city employees, 
especially when it comes to seniority and bumping 
rights during layoffs. 
Viewed in the aggregate, the mayor and the City 
Council clearly have a plan, and its essence is to 
use the cover of a deep recession to institute many 
existing proposals, usually labeled “neoliberalism.” 
In the view of the think tanks and politicians, its 
intent is to make government more “business-
friendly.” In more straight talk, it is “crony 
capitalism” or the use of taxpayer money to increase 
the short-term profits of private investors with 
political connections. 
Although most of the pols don’t see it, there is 
a deeper method to their madness. They delude 
themselves with claims about imminent prosperity 
and that they are just pursuing short-term budget 
fixes until the U.S. economy recovers from a deep 
recession. Few of them realize that the U.S. economy, 
like the global economy, is in the midst of a deep, 
long-term financial crisis. Most of their cuts and 
layoffs are here to stay and will get worse as more 
components of their Race to the Bottom Plan are 
unveiled and implemented. 
If an economic recovery eventually returns, it is not 
going to be used to raise the salaries and benefits 
of public employees, fortify pension funds, build 
libraries, plant trees and educate students. This 
is because, sadly, the decision-makers prefer to 
sacrifice most local government functions to pay for 
other government priorities, in particular real estate 
subsidies, corporate bailouts, military hardware and 
foreign wars. 
Their plans to fill these enormous local gaps with such 
gimmicks as additional charter schools, high stakes 
testing, contracting out and privatization are nothing 
more than an unintended strategy to reach bottom. While 
the pols might actually believe in these schemes, or that 
cities like Los Angeles can function without adequate 
city plans, schools, libraries, parks, urban forests, 
cultural events, building inspectors, plan checkers and 
neighborhood groups, they are really diverting local 
public resources to support federal priorities. 
There are some clear lessons to be learned from this 
debacle:
1) The slashing and burning of most local 
public services is a long-term trend, not just a 
blip resulting from the Great Recession. 
2) Its purpose is not just to dish out public 
favors to well-connected investors who need a 
short-term boost in their bottom line through 
contracts or bailouts, but to martial public 
resources for other projects and programs.
3) So far, the public employee unions do not 
have an effective program to reverse these 
trends. They have yet to organize work actions 
to stop cutbacks and layoffs or form strong 
alliances with the public, the other victim 
of cutbacks. For the most part, the primary 
political strategy of the employee unions is to 
fund the campaigns of the very same politicians 
who are imposing furloughs and layoffs on 
their members.
4) Any solutions to this long-term crisis will 
come from the bottom up, not the top down. 
There are no politicians on the horizon capable 
of rectifying this situation, or economists with 
a magic formula to fill local government coffers 
in order to provide high-quality employment 
and public services. So far, students and 
teachers have taken the lead in direct actions, 
and they have provided a model for other 
public employees and the general public to 
form effective political alliances.
Richard Platkin (rhplatkin@yahoo.com) is a Los Angeles-based 
planning consultant and invites comments on this article.
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For “progressive planners,” one 
of the ways to sustain vision is 
to examine cases of best practice. 
Prominent among such cases would 
be the progressive city, where 
not only city planners, but also 
city government and institutions, 
support goals like redistribution of 
wealth and open participation in 
important decisions. 
Chicago during the mayoralty of 
Harold Washington, from 1983 
until Washington’s sudden death in 
1987, was such a case. Washington, 
the city’s first black mayor, was 
a reform mayor, implementing 
court orders to reduce patronage 
appointments, and, less remarked 
upon, redistributive policies 
through the appointment of 
community economic development 
activists to administrative posts. 
“Jobs not Real Estate”
The central redistributive principle 
of Washington’s administration was 
the “jobs policy.” It had its origins 
in the burgeoning community 
development movement, whose 
activists saw manufacturing 
jobs as the key to many of the 
issues facing neighborhoods. 
By 1982, industrial retention 
had become a key issue. This 
came into focus in a community 
meeting in August 1982 called to 
craft a response to a Reaganite 
“enterprise zone” proposal that, 
The Progressive City: 
Notes on Chicago and Harold Washington
by Pierre Clavel
claiming to create jobs, would 
cut wages and regulations in 
designated inner-city areas. Rob 
Mier, a University of Illinois-
Chicago professor who had been 
engaging community development 
activists, found himself facilitating 
the discussion on the floor. The 
proposal was drawing anger and 
negative comment, so Mier drew 
the audience into a proactive 
discussion. Economic development, 
the audience seemed to be saying, 
meant “jobs, not real estate.” There 
were other proposals, many of 
which resulted in the “platform” for 
the new Community Workshop on 
Economic Development (CWED). 
The “jobs not real estate” idea, or 
the “jobs goal” for short, turned out 
to have several lives. Washington 
adopted it for his campaign, fleshed 
out in a campaign document called 
The Washington Papers. Mier, who 
became commissioner of economic 
development, inserted the idea in 
two strategic plans. It was tested in 
a series of administrative initiatives 
over the next five years and 
elements survived into the 1990s. 
Saving Steel Jobs
“Jobs, not real estate” meant—in 
the CWED Platform and The 
Washington Papers—stemming the 
loss of manufacturing jobs since, 
relative to service sector jobs, 
they paid more and were more 
likely to be union jobs. Real estate 
meant downtown office towers 
and high-end residential and retail 
development, but low-end service 
sector jobs, less likely to be “good 
jobs,” that would buttress the city’s 
working-class neighborhoods. So 
the jobs goal was redistributive, at 
least holding the line against the 
inequality which, in the 1980s, was 
becoming a feature of the Chicago, 
and the U.S., economy.
Meanwhile, Chicago activists saw 
the alarming rate of factory closings 
within the city—27 percent of the 
city’s manufacturing jobs were 
lost between 1977 and 1982. Most 
spectacular was the loss of five 
large integrated steel mills near 
the city’s southeastern border. 
Washington had committed to 
create a “Task Force on Steel and 
Southeast Chicago” during the 
campaign, but when the task force 
began its work in 1985, there was 
general shock and pessimism at the 
sight of the massive, empty plants. 
The committee, laden with real 
estate-oriented businessmen, at first 
could see no future but to transform 
the site into lakefront condos. 
Mier and Washington countered 
by adding four “working groups” 
and by hiring Ann Markusen, a 
University of California economist, 
as staff director. 
Markusen began with enthusiasm 
in January 1985 and spent the 
year researching steel, attending 
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almost every task force meeting 
and producing a 500-page report 
later that year. Her research 
supported these conclusions: 
1) contrary to some opinions, 
including many within the 
industry, steel manufacturing 
was not a dying industry; 2) 
primary production of steel, 
which still employed over 7,000 
workers in Southeast Chicago 
in 1983, was connected to a 
far greater group of suppliers 
and purchasers, including 
secondary producers of products 
like machinery and consumer 
durables, which employed 15,000 
workers in Southeast Chicago, 
and nearly 300,000 workers in 
the region around Chicago; and 
3) steel production, rather than 
dead, was still an opportunity—
to the extent steel jobs could be 
saved, they would trigger a much 
larger savings in the greater 
“steel industrial complex.” The 
task force could see the point. 
The final aspect of Markusen’s 
argument was a survey of what 
might be done. There had been 
studies of steel production and de-
cline in several different places, to 
which Markusen found three typi-
cal responses: 
• “Bowing out,” i.e., giving up on 
steel production entirely, had been 
recommended by some business 
groups, including members of the 
steel industry; 
• “Bidding down” the cost of do-
ing business, particularly labor 
costs; and,
• “Building on the basics.” 
Markusen, having eliminated 
or seriously undermined the 
arguments for “bowing out” or 
“bidding down,” chose to rec-
ommend city support for the 
maintenance of at least some 
steel production capacity. 
In the end, the task force did not 
adopt the most dramatic recom-
mendation suggested by Marku-
sen’s findings—support for financ-
ing to keep at least one of the mills 
open. As she put it, “…it demurred 
from drawing the analogy between 
urban renewal, with its strong 
quasi-governmental development 
agencies and powers of eminent 
domain, and industrial renewal.” 
But in a recent comment, she 
stressed the positive results:
We made a large argument, 
inevitably, about the 
manufacturing economy 
in general, because some 
of steel’s problems were 
machinery and auto 
industry problems. You 
Former Chicago Mayor Harold 
Washington and economic 
development commissioner Rob 





cannot imagine how strong the pessimism was 
in those days, both on the part of workers and 
communities and on the part of economists 
and opinion-makers—they just thought steel 
was dead! Although the industry did retrench 
a lot in the 1980s, especially in Pittsburgh, 
Youngstown and other land-locked sites, 
it was far from fatally ill, and I think we 
made a big difference in the public case for 
manufacturing. 
Secondary Effects: Reinforcing the Jobs Goal
The Steel Task Force did not re-open any of the 
five major mills that closed during the 1980s, but 
its discussions were a backdrop and support to 
other actions—coming from city hall and from 
neighborhood institutions—that countered at least 
some of the job losses in the manufacturing sectors. It 
reinforced the Department of Economic Development 
(DED) and Mier’s bias towards “jobs, not real estate,” 
and it had implications for city support for the 
retention of manufacturing sectors. 
Some of the initiatives included city actions that 
could be implemented by executive order. Robert 
Giloth and Kari Moe report in a 1999 article that 
a 1985 executive order required that 25 percent of 
purchasing go to minority firms and 5 percent to 
women-owned firms—by 1987 the numbers were at 
29 percent and 5.6 percent, respectively. Purchasing 
from local firms increased from 30 percent to 60 
percent between 1983 and 1987, and there was an 
estimate that increasing this to 90 percent in the next 
term would create as many as 40,000 net new local 
jobs. And in the city labor force, hiring of African 
Americans went from 44 to 55 percent from 1980 to 
1986, Hispanics from 8 to 12 percent and women 
from 27 to 41 percent.
One of the early initiatives was DED support of 
the Westside Jobs Network (WJN), created through 
contracts with the University of Illinois at Chicago’s 
Center for Urban Economic Development (CUED) 
and the Midwest Center for Labor Research (MCLR). 
For both organizations, the goal was to anticipate 
shutdowns and layoffs in order to give the city and 
workers’ families a chance to blunt the effects of job 
loss and—best case—avert the shutdown altogether 
by means of buyouts and possibly city help. They 
found that reliance on management for information 
needed to be supplemented by community and 
labor sources, and for that an organized network 
was the key.                    
A longer term campaign with eventual results 
was for planned manufacturing districts (PMDs). 
This was a zoning measure that reversed the 
doctrine of “highest use” to favor manufacturing 
over competitive pressures from new residential 
and commercial development, for which there 
was increasing demand in an inner belt around 
Chicago’s downtown Loop district. After the first 
PMD was established in 1988, there were two more 
in the 1990s, and eight in 2004-2005, for a total of 
thirteen. By 1992, Washington’s long-term successor, 
Richard M. Daley, had appointed the grassroots 
initiator of the PMD idea, Donna Ducharme, as 
the chief industrial development officer and was 
supporting PMDs with planning, organizing 
and infrastructure measures, pressed on him by 
neighborhood organizations and manufacturers.
Reflections on Chicago’s Economic Policy in the 1980s
It was remarkable that Chicago’s progressive 
activists could put in place the redistributive 
and participatory reforms I have described. No 
other city had done anything comparable after 
the “progressive” period eighty to one hundred 
years earlier—city policies associated with the 
likes of Tom Johnson in Cleveland (1901-08) and 
Hazen Pingree in Detroit (1889-1996). How did 
this happen?
One factor is the long history of organizing in 
Chicago. Since at least the 1960s, blacks and liberals 
had chafed under the Chicago machine domination 
that was only beginning to fragment as Washington 
mounted his campaign. In addition, the community 
development movement, which had developed 
critical ties across race lines with “umbrella” 
organizations like CWED and the Chicago Rehab 
Network, developed its own sense of a coherent 
alternative policy as in the case of the CWED 
Platform of 1982. That the movement had support 
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and ties within Chicago universities, as in the case 
of CUED, was a critical element in the mix.
 
Going into government as DED Commissioner, 
Mier hired and supported community and labor 
people. His years as director of CUED had put 
him in touch with a wide variety of people who 
would later play roles within city hall, or play 
constructive outsider roles after the election: Kari 
Moe had worked in community-based alternative 
schools in Chicago’s Uptown neighborhood; Robert 
Giloth had been executive director of the 18th 
Street Development Corporation; Arturo Vazquez 
had been working with community organizations 
in the Latino neighborhood of Pilsen; Stephen 
Alexander was a steelworker; Donna Ducharme 
had been a youth outreach worker at the New City 
YMCA before becoming the advocate who tirelessly 
pressed for the PMDs; and Dan Swinney had been a 
steel union organizer before organizing MCLR. One 
could name dozens of others. 
But “progressives” were distinct from “organizers,” 
whose Alinskyite origins often conflicted with 
business and government officials. By the time 
of Washington’s run in 1983, significant elements 
of Chicago’s neighborhood movement sought to 
transcend the oppositional mode, to enter and take 
over government. Doing this, they knew, would 
require them to make compromises. Mier, in a 1994 
memoir, recounted many of these compromises, 
including in the case of the Steel Task Force, and 
some criticized him strongly for this. Mier felt the 
net results, however, were positive.
In addition, there is what I would call the “logic” 
argument. If support for the real estate “growth 
coalition” was the argument that manufacturing 
was dying, the Steel Task Force, while it could do 
nothing to reverse the closure of the five main mills 
in Southeast Chicago, was able to make a strong 
argument for the future of steel and manufacturing 
in general. That the city had a substantial labor 
base in that sector, and that hundreds of smaller 
manufacturers provided a basis for support, added 
weight when Markusen and others advocated 
saving the sector.  The later success of the 
PMDs, and Ducharme’s accession to the deputy 
commissionership of planning and her support 
for industrial corridor studies and infrastructure 
improvements, was based on that in part.
The question people raise about “progressive cities” 
is what relevance they have for “normal cities.” 
It is easy to deny relevance, because in cases like 
Chicago, there were not only specific innovations, 
but the political terrain was shaken fundamentally. 
But it follows that what we can learn about is 
not simply a few innovations, but also the larger 
process of political change. Thus, while Chicago 
was doing strategic planning, industrial retention, 
PMDs, executive orders and early warning 
systems, other things were happening as well. 
That “progressive planners” like Mier, Vazquez, 
Ducharme and Moe could make this happen has 
to be considered as an example for other activist 
planners in other places.
Pierre Clavel is professor of city and regional planning at 
Cornell University and is the author of The Progressive 
City: Planning and Participation, 1969-1984. This article 
is excerpted in part from Clavel’s forthcoming book from 
Cornell Press, Activists in City Hall.
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The unregulated economy of paid Mexican gardeners 
in Los Angeles constitutes an important and 
underexamined component of the city’s informal 
service sector. Paid Mexican gardeners, like Latina 
domestic workers (domésticas), represent a valuable 
labor source for the domestic household economy 
in this global city and beyond. While domestic help 
has historically been a privilege of the affluent, the 
middle class, especially after WWII, has also acquired 
the financial means to hire immigrants and racial 
minorities to perform traditional household duties. 
Due primarily to the American obsession with the 
front lawn, the influx of low-wage immigrants to 
U.S. cities since the mid-1960s and the shift from a 
manufacturing to a service economy, the demand for 
paid gardeners has become an integral part of local 
neighborhoods. 
Although this informal niche provides positive 
benefits (e.g., greener, healthier and aesthetically 
pleasing communities), planning scholars and 
practitioners have traditionally ignored this group, 
both academically and professionally. Scholarly 
publications and popular narratives commonly 
frame Mexican workers, including paid gardeners, 
domésticas and others, as a homogenous group that 
occupies low-wage jobs associated with low social 
status. To address the shortcomings in the social 
science literature and debunk the pejorative views 
towards paid Mexican gardeners, planning scholars 
and practitioners need to pay more attention to 
this unregulated workforce and address the ills 
that plague those not protected from government 
regulations and legal protections. Moreover, scholars 
and practitioners need to re-examine this niche as 
a heterogeneous group (i.e., co-ethnic workers and 
entrepreneurs) and redefine these laborers as active 
agents who engage in complex social relations and 
sophisticated economic transactions in the informal 
sector, not passive objects of ridicule who perform 
simplistic, labor-intensive activities. 
Snapshot of Paid Gardening Niche
Paid gardeners primarily consist of two social classes: 
bosses (patrones) and workers (trabajadores). While 
the patrón is the owner of the small-scale enterprise 
and handles all paperwork and business transactions, 
the trabajador works for the patrón. As the owner, 
the patrón negotiates a yard maintenance agreement 
with a homeowner/renter (cliente). Instead of legally 
binding contracts, the patrón and cliente usually 
establish an oral agreement based on the size of 
the lot, type of work requested (e.g., mow lawn, 
water plants, trim bushes), frequency of visits and 
estimated time to complete job. 
As independent contractors, patrones mostly charge 
clientes based on the nature of the job, as noted 
above, versus hourly work. Patrónes would typically 
charge from $75 to $100 per month, however, due to 
an abundance of cheap labor and fierce competition 
among co-ethnics, paid gardeners’ may charge as 
little as $50 per month for landscape services. 
Apart from monthly maintenance jobs, however, 
paid gardeners can earn well above these monthly 
rates by performing larger jobs, or “extras,” such 
as installing sprinklers or trimming trees, for extra 
pay. These jobs are typically performed during the 
weekends, and both the patrón and trabajador benefit 
in monetary terms.  
Gardeners organize themselves in small crews 
(see Figure 1). Depending on the size of the small 
enterprise, a crew can be from three to six members. 
Crews usually consist of the patrón, a few trabajadores 
and a driver (manejador). The patrón usually accesses 
The Plight of Paid Mexican Gardeners in 
Los Angeles’ Informal Economy
by Alvaro Huerta
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his social networks to hire workers, who typically 
include nuclear family members, extended family 
members (on both sides if he’s married), friends and 
hometown associates. 
The patrón also manages all aspects of the crew and 
business operations. In addition, the patrón owns all 
the tools, truck(s) and equipment (e.g., leaf blower, 
lawn mover and weed trimmer) and has direct 
contact with the clientes. Moreover, the patrón is 
responsible for covering all business costs, such as 
equipment maintenance and tool replacements, auto 
payments, insurance, gasoline and oil. The patrón is 
also responsible for hiring and paying his trabajadores. 
Contrary to the formal economy, where checks are 
the norm, the patrón usually pays the trabajadores in 
cash on a daily or weekly basis. 
Apart from the patrón and trabajador positions, 
as noted above, crews also include a manejador. 
In addition to his driving duties, the manejador 
also takes on the duties of a trabajador. Given that 
an undocumented worker cannot legally obtain 
a driver’s license in California—a trend that has 
extended to other states in the nation—the manejador 
has become a key part of the crew structure and 
usually gets paid more than the trabajador. 
Lastly, the route (ruta) represents a network of 
houses, usually accumulated by the patrón over time. 
Like any commodity in the formal market, the ruta 
has exchange value: it can be sold, traded or gifted. 
Any exchange of rutas commonly takes place in the 
informal economy. The ruta represents a patrón’s 
primary asset. Both the size and quality (amount 
being charged per house) of the ruta determines the 
patrón’s monthly earnings (and profits) and how 
many trabajadores he can afford to employ.
The Pioneers: Japanese Immigrants 
The history of Japanese immigrants and their 
descendents in the U.S. has been one of struggle, 
perseverance and triumph. During the late 
1800s, Japanese immigrants arrived and settled 
in California and other key states. The Issei (first 
generation Japanese immigrants) quickly moved into 
California’s agricultural industry, a function of their 
own agricultural background and the shortage of 
available labor. In addition to agricultural labor, the 
Issei first engaged in paid gardening in California as 
early as 1891.
Paid gardening made perfect work for the Issei since, 
like agricultural work, it required a rural background 
and provided recent immigrants with a sense of 
independence. The first paid gardeners in Southern 
California originally worked as domestic workers while 
occasionally performing yard-work for their employers. 
Compared to domestic work and manual labor, 
occupations also held by the Issei and other immigrants 
during the early 1900s, paid gardening represented a 
more profitable occupation for the Issei. 	
While the Issei managed to gain entry into the paid 
gardening industry in Los Angeles and throughout 
California during the late 1800s and early 1900s based 
on their agricultural background, their reputation 
for excellent work, and the demand for lawn care 
services by affluent residents, the passage of anti-
immigrant laws in California targeting Japanese (and 
other ethnic groups) in the agricultural industry 
pushed more Issei to seek paid gardening as a viable 
trade in major urban centers.
 
For instance, the passage of California’s 1913 anti-
immigrant land act denying “aliens ineligible for 
citizenship” from owning agricultural land forced many 
Issei to seek refuge in the cities. There, in order to earn a 
living, many Issei farmers utilized their entrepreneurial 
skills and entered the floral and nursery businesses. 
Many Issei also took advantage of the housing boom 
and labor shortages in paid gardening in the 1920s, 
creating a niche in this sector. 
 
As pioneers, the Issei paved the way in Los Angeles 
and throughout California for other rural immigrant 
groups, such as Vietnamese, Mexicans and Central 
Americans, to make an honest living in the informal 
economy.  This is not to say, however, that any recent 
immigrant who comes to this country can purchase 
a few tools and easily enter this sector to become 
a successful paid gardener or owner of his own 
small business. Given the informal nature of paid 
gardening, where few governmental regulations exist 
without formal institutions (such as classified ads 
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or vocational centers) to channel workers into this 
sector, recent and settled immigrants primarily rely 
on their social networks (e.g., kinship, friendship, 
hometown associates and homeowners) to become 
paid gardeners. 
For Japanese immigrants and second-generation 
Japanese Americans (Nissei) of the mid-1900s, paid 
gardening represented a respectable profession that 
allowed them the opportunity to earn an honest 
living for themselves and their families, especially 
given the anti-Japanese climate in this country. 
Relying on their hard work, perseverance and co-
ethnic ties, Japanese immigrants and their children 
paved the way for future generations of Japanese 
Americans to go beyond the paid gardening 
trade and prosper in this country as white-collar 
professionals via higher education. 
Ethnic Transition:  From Japanese to Mexican 
Immigrants
The gradual decline of Japanese paid gardeners in 
California dates back to the mid-1960s and 1970s when 
younger generations sought professional careers over 
this informal trade. In addition, the dramatic influx 
of Mexican immigrants following the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1965—which facilitated family 
reunification and other pro-immigration policies—
created a large labor pool of rural immigrants.  Apart 
from paid gardening, many Mexican immigrants 
worked for Japanese-American employers in their 
lawnmower repair shops and landscape nurseries.  
By originally working as hired gardeners and in 
related green industries, Mexican immigrants 
eventually became the dominant ethnic group in this 
informal niche. Retired Japanese gardeners either sold 
or gifted their businesses to Mexican immigrants, who 
displayed a similar work ethic and entrepreneurial 
spirit. Also, tired of working for someone else, many 
Mexican immigrants gradually built their own 
businesses from scratch after many years of learning 
on the job, or what the late American philosopher John 
Dewey referred to as “learning by doing.”
This informal trade provides both opportunities 
and perils to Mexican immigrants and other groups.  
LEFT: Logo of the Association of Latin American 
Gardeners of Los Angeles (ALAGLA).
RIGHT: Collage of images from an ALAGLA protest.
Logo designed by Robert Russell
cont. on page 49
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On the one hand, similar to Japanese immigrants, 
recent Mexican immigrants who experience racism 
and a hostile work environment benefit from this 
mostly informal trade where workers employ 
survival strategies and experience limited entry 
barriers. In the unregulated economy, for instance, 
recent immigrants need not worry about many 
occupational barriers found in the formal economy, 
such as providing proof of legal status in this country. 
Moreover, recent immigrants with limited English 
skills and lack of formal education can enter this 
trade without major barriers.  
Also, for a minority of immigrants, paid gardening 
represents one of the few trades where those with 
low socio-economic status enjoy the opportunity to 
start their own small enterprise. While many Asian 
immigrants (e.g., Japanese, Chinese and Koreans) and 
other Latinos, such as Cubans in Miami, have enjoyed 
business success in this country, Mexican immigrants 
tend to be low-wage workers toiling in dead-end 
jobs, or what scholars refer to as “immigrant jobs.” 
Breaking with this stereotype, Mexican immigrants 
who own a small gardening business also enjoy the 
benefits of other immigrant entrepreneurs, including 
social status (especially among co-ethnics) and 
upward mobility opportunities.
On the other hand, the paid gardening trade 
also suffers from the pernicious nature of the 
informal economy. Due to the lack of governmental 
regulations and protections, the informal economy 
is ripe with many of the same abuses workers 
experienced prior to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New 
Deal in the early twentieth century. For example, 
immigrants and others who work in the informal 
economy lack basic work-related guidelines and 
protections taken for granted by many workers in the 
formal economy, such as minimum wage protection, 
workers’ compensation benefits, work-site safety 
rules, health insurance (not for all, of course), child 
labor laws and the 40-hour work week.  
Consequently, many informal workers, including 
those who work in the paid gardening niche, work 
long hours and, sometimes, seven days a week 
with little pay and few governmental protections. 
However, the case of paid gardening should not 
be confounded with the abusive practices found 
in the garment industry, especially since many 
workers or trabajadores who enter this trade 
enjoy the opportunity to one day become a boss 
or patrón.  Also, many of these small enterprises 
depend on strong ties, where kinship and co-
ethnic ties from the same hometown bond the 
crews into family-like units.  
Lastly, paid gardeners receive a lot of abuse 
from their clients or clientes, criminals and 
mainstream society. Too often, clients refuse to 
pay gardeners for their services, knowing full well 
that these individuals possess few legal options 
to secure funds owed to them. In addition, clients 
often verbally abuse gardeners and treat them 
disrespectfully. There are also many unreported 
cases where criminals rob paid gardeners of their 
money or steal their equipment from their trucks. 
Apart from abusive clients and common criminals, 
paid gardeners receive little respect in society. In 
Hollywood movies, for example, 
Photos and collage by Adrian A
lvarez
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This is a fascinating and important book with only 
one major flaw: Since it retails at $150, it is likely to 
be out of reach for most activists and practitioners, 
and available only at university libraries. But there’s 
much in here of value to progressive planners. 
This book is important because it engages some of 
the toughest theoretical and practical questions we 
face. Is there such a thing as a “just city?” How do 
we shape a more just city? What does it look like? 
How is the just city different from “the right to the 
city?” 
The starting point of this quest is an essay by 
Harvard professor Susan S. Fainstein, who roots 
the search for a just city in contemporary urban 
struggles. She uses the example of the Bronx 
Terminal Market in New York City, a project in 
which the city administration displaced small ethnic 
businesses and turned over the land to a shopping 
mall developer. She focuses on issues of social 
justice at stake, moving away from approaches 
that emphasize the planning process as the key 
route to social justice, specifically what is known as 
communicative planning theory: 
Communicative theorists are right in 
emphasizing the importance of words, but 
for justice to prevail, it is imperative that 
the content of speech include demands for 
recognition and just distribution. Changing 
the dialogue, so that demands for equity are 
no longer marginalized, would constitute 
a first step toward reversing the current 
tendency to exclude social justice from the 
aims of urban policy.
One of the fascinating things about this collection of 
essays is that it doesn’t shy away from this and other 
debates. Contributions by James DeFillipis, Mustafa 
Dikec, Frank Fischer, David Harvey and Peter Marcuse 
draw out this debate, and in the process bring up yet 
another way of looking at the city—the Right to the 
City approach, which they tend to see as a vehicle for 
a system of basic social and economic rights and not 
simply individual rights before the law. Peter Marcuse 
also introduces the concept of “commons planning” 
as an alternative to “justice planning.” Commons 
planning seeks to address underlying structural 
Searching for the Just City: Debates in Urban 
Theory and Practice
Review by Tom Angotti
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issues relating to the land and urban space. Overall, 
the collection is a rich polemic, with Fainstein’s 
formulation that respects it by launching a discussion 
that moves far beyond it. The only thing missing is 
a final chapter in which Fainstein gets a chance to 
comment and reflect on the debate.
This collection would not be as rich if it were not 
for the contributions from outside North America. 
Too much of urban theory is rooted in the limited 
experiences at the center of the empire. Erminia 
Maricato’s chapter discusses the meaning of justice 
in Brazilian cities while another chapter by Oren 
Yiftachel, Ravit Goldhaber and Roy Nuriel discusses 
Israel and urban neocolonialism in the city of Beer 
Sheva. Johannes Novy and Margit Mayer also take 
on the myth that the European City is a model of 
social justice. However, even these are not enough 
to serve as a counterweight to debates that are 
too often Eurocentric and uninformed by the 
rich diversity of struggles and urban experiences 
throughout the world.
Finally, one of the most significant achievements of 
this collection is the leading role taken by a group 
of urban planning Ph.D. students in compiling 
it. James Connolly, Johannes Novy, Ingrid Olivo, 
Cuz Potter and Justin Steil are all in the Columbia 
University planning program. Peter Marcuse 
suggests in his preface that they bear major 
responsibility for the rigor and frankness in the 
debate, noting “…their audacity at suggesting to 
much more senior scholars that this or that logic 
did not quite hold up, this or that needed evidence, 
this or that seemed internally contradictory.” 
Too often academic discussions remain abstract, 
unchallenged and inaccessible. If you can get 
a hold of this book, you’ll also see what can 
happen when theoretical and political differences 
are constructively engaged and not obscured. 
(Attention readers: If you would like to get a hold 
of this book at a more affordable price, please send 
an email to the publisher to support the editors’ 
proposal for a paperback edition. Complete the 
form at: http://www.routledge.com/info/contact.)
Huerta, cont’d from page 47
paid gardeners represent two-dimensional, 
ignorant characters with few redeeming qualities.  
Conclusion
This short essay sheds light on the plight of paid 
Mexican gardeners in Los Angeles and beyond. 
Much more research needs to be done by planning 
scholars and practitioners to better understand this 
informal niche and address the needs of this mostly 
immigrant workforce. While planning scholars and 
practitioners mostly work within the confines of 
the formal economy, too many vulnerable workers 
toil in the informal economy without the benefits of 
governmental protections and regulations taken for 
granted by most workers in this country. 
The answer should not be for policymakers or 
planners to encourage strict regulations and 
adopt draconian laws that punish these honest, 
hardworking individuals. For instance, in an attempt 
to appease affluent Westside residents concerned 
with noisy leaf blowers, in December of 1996 the City 
of Los Angeles banned these devises in residential 
areas.  This law aimed to criminalize paid gardeners 
by punishing them for using these work devises 
with a misdemeanor, $1,000 fine and up to six 
months in jail.  In response, these mostly immigrant 
workers formed the first Latino group to defend 
their interests: the Association of Latin American 
Gardeners of Los Angeles (ALAGLA).  Assisted by 
a small group of Chicano organizers, such as Adrian 
Alvarez, Antonia Montes and myself, ALAGLA 
successfully forced the city to soften the penalties of 
this harsh ban and to demand that paid gardeners 
and other domestic workers be provided with legal 
protections and treated with the respect and dignity 
that they deserve.
Alvaro Huerta is a doctoral candidate in the Department 
of City and Regional Planning at the University of 
California, Berkeley and a visiting scholar in the Chicano 
Studies Research Center at the University of California, 
Los Angeles.  He is a co-founder, and for many years 
director of organizing, of the Association of Latin 
American Gardeners of Los Angeles (ALAGLA).  
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